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BOOK REVIEWS 
From Protecting Lives to Protecting States: Use of 
Force Across the Threat Continuum 
FIGHTING AT THE LEGAL BOUNDARIES: CONTROLLING THE USE OF FORCE IN 
CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT.  By  Kenneth Watkin. New York and Oxford: OXFORD 
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2016.  PP. 631. $150.00 
Mitt Regan* 
INTRODUCTION 
Two developments in recent decades have the potential to reshape the terms in 
which we think about state use of force by blurring the traditional categories we 
have used to analyze it.  The first is what Theodor Meron has called the “human-
ization” of the law governing armed conflict, or international humanitarian law 
(IHL).1 In this process, “the recognition as customary of norms rooted in interna-
tional human rights instruments has affected the interpretation, and eventually 
the status, of the parallel norms in instruments of international humanitarian 
law.”2  This phenomenon is reflected in increasing acceptance of the view that 
IHL does not completely displace human rights law during armed conflict, but 
that human rights law applies at all times.3   In practice, this means that IHL gen-
erally prevails with respect to matters that it specifically addresses, with human 
rights law applying in other situations.4 The result is that the two bodies of law 
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Georgetown Law Center; Senior Fellow, Stockdale Center on Ethical Leadership, United States Naval 
Academy.  I would like to thank Geoffrey Corn, Janina Dill, Monica Hakimi, David Luban, Deborah 
Pearlstein, and Kenneth Watkin for insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article. © 2019, Mitt 
Regan. 
1. Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239 (2000). 
2. Id. at 244. 
3. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136 ¶ 106 (July 9). 
4. Thus, the International Committee of the Red Cross states, “IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities 
would govern the use of force against lawful targets, i.e., the fighters and civilians directly participating in 
hostilities .... Any concomitant use of force against persons protected against direct attack would remain 
governed by the more restrictive rules on the use of force in law enforcement operations.”  INT’L COMM. 
OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF ARMED CONFLICTS 36 
(2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/international-humanitarian-law-and-challenges-contemporary- 
armed-conflicts. The United States has consistently declared that IHL is lex specialis during armed conflict 
but has acknowledged that human rights law may apply to subjects to which IHL does not speak.  Thus, for 
instance, the Department of Defense Law of War Manual says, “In some circumstances, the rules in the law 
of war and the rules in human rights treaties may appear to conflict; these apparent conflicts may be resolved 
by the principle that the law of war is the lex specialis during situations of armed conflict, and, as such, is the 
controlling body of law with regard to the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims . . .. 
[D]uring armed conflict, human rights treaties would clearly be controlling with respect to matters that are 
171 
within their scope of application and that are not addressed by the law of war. For example, a time of 
war does not suspend the operation of the ICCPR with respect to matters within its scope of 
application.”  GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DEP’T OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL 
§1.6.3.1 (2016), http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/law-of-war-manual-june-2015.pdf. 
must be interpreted during armed conflict in a way that gives due weight to the 
concerns of each.5 
The second development is the emergence of transnational threats to security 
that do not consist of conventional state armed forces that are distinguishable 
from civilians.  These threats are comprised of loose networks of non-state actors 
who may have access to significant instruments of harm that they deploy outside 
of a centralized command structure.  This has raised questions about the extent to 
which the conventional conception of armed conflict, based on the model of 
armed forces engaged in large-scale hostilities, is adequate to guide states in how 
they may respond to these threats.6 
As Deborah Pearlstein has described in her discussion of this development, the 
traditional binary framework distinguishing law enforcement from armed conflict 
provides a crucial “on-off switch.”  The existence of an armed conflict permits 
first-resort use of lethal force without regard to individual culpability, which is 
forbidden outside of this situation.7  
7. Deborah Pearlstein, Armed Conflict at the Threshold? VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 
3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3130225. 
It also permits unintended civilian deaths in 
an attack as long as they are not “excessive” compared to the anticipated military 
advantage that the attack will gain.8  In this respect, the boundary between the use 
of force inside and outside of armed conflict represents a moral Rubicon, dividing 
two morally distinct universes.  For some critics, reliance on this boundary is an 
anachronism that fails to capture the complexity of the situations that states  
5. See, e.g., DARAGH MURRAY, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 
(2016); GERD OBERLEITNER, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICT (2015); RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW (Robert Kulb & Floria Gaggioli eds., 2013); RENE PROVOST, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND HUMANITARIAN LAW (2002); Oona Hathaway et al., Which 
Law Governs During Armed Conflict? The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1883 (2012); Noam Lubell, Parallel Application of International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: An Examination of the Debate, 40 ISR. L. 
REV. 648 (2007). 
6. See, e.g., HELEN DUFFY, THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2d. ed. 2015); CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA’S POST-9/11 PRESIDENCY (2015); MARK 
MAZZETTI, THE WAY OF THE KNIFE: THE CIA, A SECRET ARMY, AND A WAR AT THE ENDS OF THE 
EARTH (2013); NEW BATTLEFIELDS, OLD LAWS: CRITICAL DEBATES ON ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 
(William C. Banks ed., 2011); PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY- 
FIRST CENTURY (2008); GLOBAL INSURGENCY AND THE FUTURE OF ARMED CONFLICT: DEBATING 
FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE (Terry Terriff, Aaron Kapp & Regina Karp eds., 2008). 
8. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, art. 57(2)(a)(iii), Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. The notion that civilian deaths are “unintended” even though they 
are foreseeable and inflicted with knowledge that they will occur rests on the doctrine of double effect. 
See Alison Hills, Intentions, Foreseen Consequences and the Doctrine of Double Effect, 133 PHILOS. 
STUD. 257 (2007). 
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face in the contemporary threat environment.9  As a result, as Pearlstein notes, “a 
growing array of critics today call into question the wisdom and utility of preserv-
ing the ‘armed conflict’ threshold as a proxy test for the legality of first-resort 
killing.”10 
Each of the two developments that I have described blurs the line between 
what conventionally have been two discrete and relatively self-contained concep-
tual categories.  The implications of this, however, are different in each case. 
The simultaneous co-existence of human rights law and IHL raises the prospect 
that war may be fought more humanely.  Human rights law may elaborate in 
more detail the provisions of IHL based on the principle of humanity.  More 
ambitiously, it may even alter our understanding of the competing principle of 
military necessity in a way that gives greater weight to the principle of human-
ity.11  
11. See, e.g., NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE 
NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 77-83 (2009), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/ 
other/icrc-002-0990.pdf. 
Most ambitiously, some suggest that IHL should be seen as a subset of 
human rights law, which shares the latter’s core commitment to the intrinsic value 
of human life.12 
By contrast, dissatisfaction with the traditional binary framework governing 
the use of force could lead to more expansive permissions for state use of force. 
One impetus for this is the view that a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC) 
should not be limited to hostilities within a single state, but may involve a “trans-
national” conflict between a state and non-state forces that operate in more than 
one state.13  Others suggest creating a new hybrid category that draws on both 
law enforcement and armed conflict standards to provide authority more permis-
sive than the former but more restrictive than the latter.14  Finally, one critic pro-
poses abandoning reliance altogether on ostensibly outmoded binary categories, 
in favor of engaging in contextual analysis that focuses on the underlying values 
at stake in each particular situation.15  To varying degrees, these approaches may 
increase the prospect that states will be able to use force based on standards that 
are drawn at least in part from IHL more often than they do now.  The conse-
quence of the two trends that I have described thus may be that, even as war 
becomes more humane, it may become more widespread. 
9. See, e.g., ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME 
EVERYTHING (2016); Monica Hakimi, A Functional Approach to Targeting and Detention, 110 MICH. L. 
REV. 1365 (2012). 
10. Pearlstein, supra note 7, at 3. 
12. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 183 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (“The general principle of respect for human dignity . . . is the very 
raison d’ etre of international humanitarian law and human rights law; indeed in modern times it has 
become of such paramount importance as to permeate the whole body of international law.”). 
13. See, e.g., Geoffery S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A Principled 
Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 IsR. L. Rev. 46 (2012); Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
14. See BROOKS, supra note 9. 
15. See Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1388. 
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Brigadier General (Ret.) Kenneth Watkin has first-hand experience with both 
these trends in many years of service as a lawyer with the Canadian armed forces, 
culminating in his position as Judge Advocate General of the Canadian military. 
Watkin also has offered valuable reflections on these experiences over the years 
as a prolific scholar of international law.  His rich and insightful recent book, 
Fighting at the Legal Boundaries: Controlling the Use of Force in Contemporary 
Conflict, is a notable contribution to the discussion of the implications of the 
trends that I have described.  He argues that the twenty-first century approach to 
conflict must be “holistic” in nature.16  That is, on the one hand it must it must 
acknowledge “the simultaneous application of humanitarian and human rights 
law,” and the greater influence of the latter in shaping perceptions of the legiti-
macy of violence.17  On the other hand, it must appreciate that “the altered secu-
rity environment of this century has witnessed a definite move away from 
looking at conflict itself as being uniquely conventional or unconventional,” as 
transnational non-state organized armed groups have emerged that do not resem-
ble traditional armed forces. 
Watkin notes that, even as theorists contend over the implications of blurred 
boundaries and the integrity of distinctive categories, commanders on the ground 
have no choice but to respond in flexible ways that incorporate principles from 
multiple bodies of law.  “The theory of ‘exclusion,’” he says, “where each body 
of law is treated in isolation from the other, is simply inconsistent with the types 
of operational challenges faced by military commanders and the questions being 
asked of State legal advisors.”18   This accounts for the emergence of the distinct 
field of operational law, which aims to provide guidance on how to “resolve the 
simultaneous application, interaction, and overlap of the various bodies of law.”19 
Watkin’s book can be seen both as a work of operational law and a major 
scholarly treatment of the law governing the use of force.  It provides detailed 
accounts of how situations arise on the ground that evade easy classification in 
terms of our existing conceptual and legal categories. These will provide vivid 
instruction for those not familiar with the reality of modern military operations. 
At the same time, it furnishes a valuable framework for analyzing the features of 
such operations that are relevant in assessing how force should be used in particu-
lar scenarios.  Finally, Watkin offers a set of principles for both operational law 
and broader policy decisions to help navigate the complex terrain of modern se-
curity challenges. 
I cannot hope here to do justice to all the ideas in this multi-layered book.  In 
this review, I will first discuss the trends that Watkin regards as posing novel and 
16. KENNETH WATKIN, FIGHTING AT THE LEGAL BOUNDARIES: CONTROLLING THE USE OF FORCE IN 
CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT 573 (2016). 
17. Id. at 574 n.20. 
18. Id. at 574. 
19. Id.; see, e.g., GEOFFREY S. CORN & RACHEL E. VAN LANDINGHAM, U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS 
LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2015); TERRY GILL & DIETER FLECK, THE HANDBOOK OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS (2010). 
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difficult challenges for states accustomed to conceptualizing hostilities requiring 
the use of military force as having certain typical features.  I will then discuss 
two of his ideas that are especially relevant to the question of how much the 
traditional categories of law enforcement guided by human rights principles 
and armed conflict governed by IHL should continue to frame our thinking 
about the use of force.  The first idea is Watkin’s suggestion that state forces 
should presumptively operate under law enforcement rules until this is insuffi-
cient to meet a threat, even in the course of an armed conflict.  The second is 
his acceptance and elaboration of the view that we should determine the exis-
tence of a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) based on an analysis of a 
“totality of the circumstances” rather than the two current criteria.20  This 
approach, he says, may lead to the designation of certain specific hostile 
engagements as armed conflicts of limited duration. 
Watkin’s first suggestion reflects the incorporation of human rights principles 
as a matter of policy even when more permissive rules on use of force are avail-
able.  His second suggestion arguably reflects movement in the opposite direc-
tion: that some situations that we conventionally regard as subject to human 
rights principles should be temporarily governed by IHL during a period of 
intense engagements. 
Despite Watkin’s thorough description of the pressures that modern security 
threats place on our binary framework for evaluating force, his proposed 
approach still relies on the categories of law enforcement and armed conflict to 
guide analysis.  Is this warranted?  I will address this question by discussing 
Monica Hakimi’s argument that the complex operational reality that Watkin 
describes should lead us for the most part to eschew using these two categories in 
judging the permissibility of uses of force.21  Instead, Hakimi maintains, we 
should engage in case-by case contextual analysis based on a set of principles 
that are common to both categories. 
Hakimi makes important and useful points in her provocative argument.  I con-
clude, however, that these categories remain useful even in a world in which 
many threats and hostilities do not conform to the paradigmatic scenarios of ei-
ther category.  One reason is that human rights law is more flexible than many re-
alize, and that it provides an important deontological constraint on any tendency 
to move too quickly to the consequentialist domain of IHL.  By “consequential-
ist” I mean the view that the morality of an action should be evaluated according 
to the outcomes that it produces compared to other alternative courses of action.22 
20. Prior suggestions of the use of this test can be found in Laurie S. Blank & Geoffrey R. Corn, 
Losing the Forest for the Trees: Syria, Law, and the Pragmatics of Conflict Recognition, 46 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 693 (2013); Prosecutor v. Boskoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T 90, Judgment, ¶257 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008). 
21. See Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1370. 
22. JULIA DRIVER, CONSEQUENTIALISM 5 (2012).  I do not distinguish at this point between a rights 
consequentialist approach for which the relevant outcomes are the net violation of rights and a more 
thoroughgoing consequentialism whose focus is not restricted to such outcomes. I discuss the difference 
supra in the text accompanying notes 291-296. 
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A second reason is that a case-by-case approach implicitly uses the deontologi-
cal presumptions of human rights law as its frame of reference, thereby eliding the 
fact that at some point a consequentialist approach is unavoidable.  When we reach 
that point, I argue, it is better explicitly to acknowledge it.  Notwithstanding argu-
ments in some quarters that the distinction between war and peace has become so 
blurred as to become meaningless, the distinction marks a moral Rubicon between 
two radically different moral universes.  A better approach, I suggest, is Watkin’s 
framework, which continues to rely on these two categories and their incommen-
surable moral perspectives, while adopting flexible policy presumptions that 
attempt to conform as much as possible to the presumptions of human rights law. 
This may mean that in many cases we navigate the Rubicon while attempting to 
avoid crossing it. 
I. THE CHALLENGES 
In its simplest form, the paradigmatic scenario that informs the use of force 
under human rights law is the cop on the beat, while the scenario that informs 
IHL is World War II.  Much of Watkin’s book is devoted to exploring the ways in 
which many security threats that require the use of force do not squarely corre-
spond to either scenario.  He suggests that responding to these threats potentially 
may implicate the law governing state resort to force, IHL, international human 
rights law, international criminal law, and domestic law, including human rights 
law.  The tendency to treat “these areas of law in an exclusionary fashion,” he 
says, “presents considerable challenges for practitioners attempting to apply the 
law across the full range of conflict.”23 What is necessary, he argues, is an 
approach that seeks to integrate these bodies of law as circumstances demand. 
While Watkin describes developments in recent years that have increased the 
need for such integration, he observes that there has always been some need for it 
even in what we might regard as conventional conflicts between states.  Any war-
time operation that involves occupation of territory, for instance, places an obli-
gation on the occupying force to provide security for the local population.  Thus, 
the Fourth Geneva Convention requires that an occupier maintain the penal laws 
of the occupied territory in place, and states that it is responsible for the “effective 
administration of justice.”  It also imposes a wide range of responsibilities to pro-
vide for the welfare of the local population, including the provision of various 
public services. 
While IHL is the source of these responsibilities, the role of the occupier as the 
governing authority in the territory arguably subjects it to the human rights obli-
gations that accompany that status.24  Furthermore, human rights law can supple-
ment IHL in cases in which more detailed guidance is necessary on the 
23. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 14. 
24. Aeyal M. Gross, Human Proportions: Are Human Rights the Emperor’s New Clothes of the 
International Law of Occupation?, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2007); Danio Campanelli, The Law of 
Military Occupation Put to the Test of Human Rights Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 653 (2008). 
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responsibilities of humanity set forth in the latter body of law.  In particular, the 
policing role played by the occupying forces requires reference to human rights 
law and law enforcement standards to determine the rules governing the use of 
force.  Thus, Watkin notes, militaries often have needed simultaneously to draw 
on IHL and human rights law for guidance on the use of force during conditions 
of armed conflict, depending on whether their interaction is with combatants or 
innocent civilians and on the functions that they are performing.  As I discuss fur-
ther below, Watkin draws on the concept of territorial control to suggest that 
extraterritorial state human rights obligations may arise even in circumstances 
that do not formally constitute an occupation. 
Watkin maintains that the need for greater integration of multiple bodies of 
law has become more urgent in light of how military operations and situations of 
conflict have evolved in recent years.  Indeed, he argues that such integration is 
already occurring at the operational level even when it fails to occur at the strate-
gic level.  First, it is increasingly the case that “participation in war requires a 
capacity to perform conventional operations; conduct counterinsurgency opera-
tions, or otherwise fight guerilla wars; and assist in maintaining law and order in 
respect of a civilian population.”25 Second, militaries are now commonly engaged 
outside of war in a “myriad of lower intensity operations such as counterinsur-
gency, counterterrorism, noncombat evacuation, international hostage rescue, 
and peace support operations.”26  The result is that state forces now confront secu-
rity threats across the continuum of violence that call for calibrated levels of force 
and rules of engagement (ROE) for which the current binary framework often 
may seem to provide limited guidance. 
This complexity of the operational environment is captured in Marine Corps 
General Charles Krulak’s well-known concept of the “three-block war.”27 This 
represents situations in which forces may be engaged on one block in traditional 
armed conflict, on a second block in peacekeeping, and on yet a third block in 
providing humanitarian assistance.  One challenge for commanders is the need to 
conduct simultaneous operations over the span of these three “blocks” that 
require different standards for the use of force.  A second challenge is that the se-
curity threats with which each operation contends are unlikely to remain static 
and confined to discrete blocks, but may morph into lesser or more violent threats 
that require corresponding adjustments to ROE.  As Krulak puts it, armed forces 
“may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a 
few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks.”28 
Watkin argues that the need for integration among legal regimes is especially 
urgent given the fact that hostilities between states and non-state groups are now 
more prevalent than conflicts between states.  “In the twenty-first century,” 
25. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 8-9. 
26. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 15. 
27. Gen. Charles C. Krulak, The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War, MARINE 
CORPS GAZETTE (Jan. 1999), at 18, 20-21. 
28. Id. at 20. 
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Watkin observes, “other States are no longer uniquely viewed as the most signifi-
cant security threat.  Instead, that threat is presented in the form of an exception-
ally diverse set of non-State actors. . . .”29  IHL contains a detailed set of 
regulations to govern force in conflicts between states, known as international 
armed conflict (IAC), but provides sparse guidance on those involving non-state 
groups, denominated as non-international armed conflict (NIAC).30 
The main reason for the latter is that state signatories to IHL conventions gen-
erally assumed that NIACs would involve rebels challenging government author-
ity.  States preferred to treat such conflicts as involving the unlawful use of force 
by criminals who are subject to domestic law, rather than as matters of concern to 
the international community.31  Thus, for instance, while the law relating to IACs 
distinguishes between and defines combatants and non-combatants, the law gov-
erning NIACs does not.  This is because the term “combatant” designates some-
one who is an enemy soldier entitled to engage in violence as part of warfare. 
This is a status that states are reluctant to bestow on persons they regard essen-
tially as outlaws who should be subject to criminal prosecution for the unlawful 
use of force. 
The rise of transnational terrorism, however, and of insurgencies drawing 
support from sources in multiple states, challenge the notion that conflicts with 
non-state groups are purely internal matters subject to the law enforcement juris-
diction of a single state.  Actors located in one state can pose a threat to several 
other states, and thus are not solely the concern of the territorial state.  These 
other states may be less reluctant than the territorial state to declare that they are 
engaged in a NIAC with a transnational non-state armed group.32  The growing 
prevalence of conflicts between states and non-state groups thus places increasing 
strain on the underdeveloped framework for regulating NIACs. 
While adjustments within rules of engagement may help calibrate the use of 
force, the extent of those adjustments will be constrained by relatively restrictive 
law enforcement standards unless an engagement passes the threshold of consti-
tuting an armed conflict. With respect to hostilities with non-state armed groups, 
a commonly held view is that the criteria for this are that violence must rise to a 
certain level of intensity, and the non-state entity involved in it must have a rea-
sonably integrated organizational structure that indicates its ability to engage in  
29. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 569. 
30. Compare Additional Protocol I, supra note 8 (discussion of IAC), with Additional Protocol II to 
the Geneva Conventions, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, and Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 
Prisoners of War Convention] (discussion of NIAC). 
31. As with the United States, they may be less reluctant to recognize a NIAC when the threat is 
posed from outside the state.  See Geoffrey R. Corn, Drone Warfare and the Erosion of Traditional 
Limits on War Powers, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REMOTE WARFARE 246 (Jens David Ohlin ed., 
2017). 
32. Notably, for instance, the United States.  See Authorization for the Use of Military Force 115 
Stat. 224, 107th Cong. (Sept. 18, 2001). 
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ongoing violence rather than a single attack.33  In addition, some formulations 
provide that the violence must be “protracted” rather than consisting of isolated 
incidents.34  Once these criteria are met, the law enforcement switch is turned off 
and the more permissive IHL switch is turned on. The consequences of determin-
ing that an armed conflict exists thus can be of critical importance for a com-
mander and a political decision-maker. 
This state of affairs can be problematic with respect to decisions about the 
appropriate level of force to use in responding to a threat.  On the one hand, state 
officials who perceive the law enforcement template as restricting force based on 
the paradigm of police encounters with criminals may conclude that this template 
is inadequate to deal with the threat at hand.   They thus may have an incentive to 
treat an engagement as an armed conflict in order to gain the expansive permis-
sions under that regime.  On the other hand, it may be difficult to satisfy the crite-
ria for armed conflict if that paradigm is seen as requiring ongoing extended 
hostilities that involve non-state groups organized in a manner akin to state armed 
forces. 
Another issue raised by the growth of transnational terrorism is whether a state 
that regards itself as involved in a NIAC is permitted to use force against its non- 
state adversary operating in another state.35  The principle of sovereignty dictates 
that the territorial states from which such groups operate have the primary respon-
sibility for addressing unlawful activity occurring within them under those states’ 
domestic law enforcement regimes.  It requires that the threatened state obtain 
the consent of the territorial state to use force against the threat located in the lat-
ter.  Non-state armed groups, however, may operate in effectively ungoverned or 
weakly governed states that may not be able to respond effectively to them.  In 
addition, factions in these states may receive support from, or at least acquiesce 
in the presence of, non-state armed groups. 
If consent is not forthcoming from such a state, does a threatened state that 
nonetheless uses force against non-state actors within the first state violate UN 
Charter Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use of force against the territorial integ-
rity of another state?  Some observers believe so, and argue that this establishes 
an international armed conflict between the two states in which the intervening 
state is the aggressor.36  Others contend that UN Charter Article 51 permits a state 
to use force in self-defense when doing so is necessary and proportionate.37 
37. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We Came to Debate Whether 
There Is A ‘Legal Geography of War’, in FUTURE CHALLENGES IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW 8-9 (Peter 
Berkowitz ed., 2011), http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/FutureChallenges_Anderson.pdf; 
Some states claim that if a territorial state is unwilling or unable to neutralize a 
33. Prosecutor v Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); INT’L L. ASS’N, 
FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010). 
34. See, e.g., Tadic, IT-94-1-1 ¶ 70. 
35. See NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS (2011). 
36. See, e.g., Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 32, 73 (Elizabeth Wilmhurst ed., 2012). 
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threat emanating from its territory, it may be necessary in order to engage in 
effective self-defense for the threatened state to enter the other state to eliminate 
the threat.38  The profoundly different ways in which the same conduct may be 
characterized testifies to the lack of consensus about this scenario.  As Watkin 
argues, non-state threats “challenge not only the authority of States but also the 
very basis of the Westphalia system of governance” whose bedrock principle is 
the inviolability of state sovereignty.39 
Even if entry into a territorial state is permissible, what body of law governs 
the intervening state’s use of force against the threatening non-state group?  On 
one view, that state is simply performing the law enforcement function that the 
territorial state is unable to perform, which suggests that human rights law is the 
appropriate regulatory regime. On the other hand, if the threatened state is in a 
NIAC with a non-state group whose members are planning hostilities from 
another state, does that mean that the threatened state is entitled to use force under 
IHL in the territorial state?40  
40. See, e.g., Eric Holder, Attorney General, Address at Northwestern Law School (Mar. 5, 2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-northwestern-university-school- 
law; John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and Counterterrorism, Strengthening 
Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives. 
gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values- 
an; Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. State Dept., Keynote Address: The Obama Administration 
and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), in 104, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 207, 218-20 (2010). 
The United States takes the position that it is in a 
global armed conflict against Al Qaeda and associated forces, which provides 
authority to use IHL against combatants wherever they are located.41  Others con-
test this claim, and argue, for instance, that IHL governs only in locations in 
which the criteria for a NIAC are met.42 
With regard to the last issue, is it appropriate that the criterion for an IAC is 
simply any use of military force by one state against another, regardless of its in-
tensity, while the criteria for a NIAC are more demanding?43  On the one hand, as 
Watkin observes, “a high threshold for the existence of an armed conflict favors 
the application of human rights–based law enforcement” as the governing legal 
regime.44 This can be a useful impediment to the temptation to use more force 
than is necessary, especially in hostilities in which it often is difficult to distin-
guish combatants from innocent civilians.  At the same time, Watkin suggests, 
Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in 
Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 237, 238-44 (2010). 
38. Ashley Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial 
Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 495 (2012). 
39. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 569. 
41. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 40, at 218. 
42. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, When Is A War Not A War? The Myth of the Global War on 
Terror, 12 INT’L L. STUDENTS ASS’N J. INT’L & COMP. L. 535, 537 (2005). 
43. On criteria for IAC, see INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY I GENEVA CONVENTION 
FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶ 
218 (Knut Do¨rmann et al. eds., 2016) (“Armed conflicts in the sense of Article 2(1) are those which oppose 
High Contracting Parties (i.e. States) and occur when one or more States have recourse to armed force 
against another State, regardless of the reasons for or the intensity of the confrontation.”). 
44. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 365. 
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the threshold cannot be insensitive to the nature of the particular threat that secu-
rity forces confront.  “An essential task for the international community and State 
security forces,” he says, “is to establish a threshold for conflict that matches the 
reality of the violence being faced on the ground.”45  Furthermore, even if each 
tactical use of force is governed by IHL, should the overall operation be con-
strained by the more restrictive necessity and proportionality requirements of the 
jus ad bellum?46 
Finally, organization of non-state groups along transnational lines may mean 
that they are able to accumulate and deploy resources against a territorial state 
that overwhelm the capacity of conventional law enforcement operations by that 
state to respond effectively to them.  While this state may prefer not to claim that 
it is engaged in an armed conflict, some engagements with non-state forces may 
require the use of military-grade weapons and tactics, which fits uneasily at best 
within the law enforcement framework.  Should these incidents be regarded as 
hostilities within a NIAC, even if the territorial state does not treat them as such? 
The fluidity of modern security threats and violent engagements with them 
thus create challenges in responding in ways that are effective but constrained 
with respect to taking human life.  Human rights norms expressed in law enforce-
ment principles generally emphasize the goal of protecting individuals from rela-
tively urgent threats, and therefore place strict limits on the use of deadly force. 
Such threats arise from individuals, or from groups of them, on a scale that 
presents a danger to identified persons, but not to the capacity of the state to per-
form its basic functions. 
By contrast, IHL reflects the need to respond to collective threats that are sub-
stantial enough to pose such a threat to the state, and thereby to the population 
that the state is responsible for protecting.  This widens the lens to permit the use 
of force on a much larger scale.  It also authorizes the use of force against persons 
based on their membership in a collective rather than their responsibility for pos-
ing an identifiable threat to particular individuals.47  While human rights law 
applies at all times during any period of violence, at some point the nature of that 
violence is deemed to reach a threshold that results in a dramatically different 
perspective on the interests at stake and the force that can be used to protect 
them.  Hostile engagements may occur on a continuum of violence that call for 
gradually calibrated state responses, but at some point the law posits a radical dis-
continuity in the force that it permits as it shifts from human rights law to IHL. 
Watkin argues that there is a pressing need to “situate the solution for counter-
ing contemporary non-State actor threats in an analytical framework that 
more broadly encompasses conventional conflict, irregular warfare, and criminal  
45. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 365. 
46. See WATKIN, supra note 16, at 55-89. 
47. See Geoffrey R. Corn, Laurie R. Blank, Chris Jenks & Eric Talbot Jensen, Belligerent Targeting 
and the Invalidity of a Least Harmful Means Rule, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 536 (2013) (elaborating on the 
distinction between individualized and collective threats). 
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activity. . . .”48 He suggests several ways to incorporate more flexibility on the 
operational level than strict adherence to the reigning dichotomy would provide. 
His suggestions are based on both his appreciation of how commanders have 
sought to integrate different bodies of law more smoothly, as well as his own 
analysis of how the values at stake might best be accommodated.  They also 
reflect a strong commitment to human rights values in their emphasis on use of 
the minimal level of force necessary to deal effectively with a threat. 
I will focus on two important suggestions by Watkin that illuminate significant 
issues regarding the relationship between human rights law and IHL, and whether 
these categories should continue to guide our thinking on state use of force.  The 
first is his recommendation that the default approach to responding to violent 
threats by non-state groups should be the use of force under a law enforcement 
framework whenever this is realistically feasible.  The second is that the criteria 
for a NIAC should not be limited to the current two criteria that are widely cited, 
but should depend on an assessment of the “totality of the circumstances.”49 
Among other things, this creates the possibility that discrete short-term violent 
engagements may be regarded as limited duration armed conflicts regulated by 
IHL standards for the period of the engagement. 
II. FIGHTING AT THE LEGAL BOUNDARIES 
A. Human Rights Law as the Default Regime 
In dealing with violence by transnational non-state groups, Watkin argues that 
“the response by the targeted State should become expected to be human rights– 
based when feasible, and [when] it can be applied to effectively deal with the 
threat.”50  It should be “incumbent upon a state to explain why it does not follow 
this approach.”  This “police primacy” policy,51 drawn from counterinsurgency 
policy, applies both to attacks within a state by a non-state group, as well as 
attacks by such groups outside that state on a state’s citizens or facilities.  Every 
effort should be made to address a threat within the limits imposed by law 
enforcement standards, Watkin says, with a reluctance to declare the existence of 
an armed conflict that triggers IHL rules. 
Perhaps more controversially in some quarters, police primacy also means 
that, even when state forces are engaged in an armed conflict, they should seek 
whenever reasonably possible to use force in conformity with the human rights 
principles reflected in the law enforcement regulatory regime.  In other words, 
states should not hesitate in armed conflict to rely on the expansive permissions 
of IHL when doing so is required to fight effectively.  They also, however, should 
be alert to opportunities to use lesser levels of force when that will not compro-
mise their objectives in the conflict. 
48. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 570. 
49. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 375. 
50. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 606. 
51. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 224. 
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Watkin sets forth a decision tree that identifies the key junctures at which deci-
sions must be made that affect the rules that govern the use of force.52  First, if an 
attack is not deemed to be part of an armed conflict, the state is required to follow 
law enforcement standards.  Second, even if an armed conflict exists, a state must 
follow these standards with respect to any civilians not directly participating in 
hostilities.  Third, within an armed conflict a state should adopt a policy to default 
to a law enforcement approach in responding to a threat within its territory, 
guided by domestic human rights law that must be broadly consistent with inter-
national human rights norms.  The presumption to follow this approach may be 
rebutted if operations conducted under law enforcement standards are ineffective 
in dealing with the threat.  Fourth – also within armed conflict – in responding to 
attacks on the state outside its territory when the territorial state is unwilling or 
unable to address the threat, a state as a matter of policy should follow interna-
tional human rights law as expressed in law enforcement standards.  The law 
enforcement approach can be abandoned, however, if it is “not operationally fea-
sible or effective.”53 
Watkin describes examples of ways in which the policy to give priority to law 
enforcement norms whenever possible can be implemented.  First, a police pri-
macy approach can be used to counter transnational insurgency and terrorism as 
military forces are asked to support other security forces or take on responsibility 
themselves for the provision of security.  Second, national command can impose 
restrictions on the use of force through rules of engagement or policy based on 
unit and individual self-defense principles or law enforcement norms.  Finally, 
human rights norms may be used to limit the use of force in targeted killing oper-
ations in armed conflict, such as the Obama administration’s imposition of 
restrictions on direct action outside of “areas of active hostilities” that approxi-
mate human rights standards.54  The overall approach thus is based on “defaulting 
to the application of human rights–based law enforcement when it proves an 
effective means of dealing with the threat.  Such a default should be the norma-
tive standard to which all States are expected to act.”55 
“There is much to be gained,” Watkin observes, “in reinforcing the role of po-
licing in terms of avoiding the death and destruction that can result from armed 
conflict.”56  In addition, perceptions of the legitimacy of uses of force appear 
increasingly to be sensitive to civilian death and injury, with expectations in 
some cases such as the use of airpower that “such casualties could or at least 
should be reduced to almost zero.  In other words, according to a human rights 
law standard.”57  Furthermore, counterinsurgency campaigns that seek to gain 
support from the local population can undermine that aim if harm to civilians 
52. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 617. 
53. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 617. 
54. See infra p. 190 for a fuller discussion of this policy. 
55. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 605. 
56. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 590. 
57. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 602. 
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calls into question the ability and willingness of the local government to protect 
its citizens.  Finally, arresting and prosecuting insurgents and terrorists as crimi-
nals can impose a stigma that undermines any perceptions of the legitimacy of 
their activity. 
B. The Flexibility of Human Rights Law 
Watkin’s support for a default law enforcement approach rests on the belief 
that this approach “allows the use of force on a much broader scale than is often 
acknowledged.”58  A common perception is that law enforcement standards per-
mit the use of force only to avert an imminent threat to oneself or to others.  Such 
a formulation, Watkin notes, “leaves little scope for the use of deadly force, if 
necessary, to maintain order in society.”59  Article 2 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR), however, states that it is not a violation of the right to 
life when force that is no more than is absolutely necessary is used not only in 
defense of anyone from unlawful violence, but also “in order to effect a lawful 
arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained,” as well as “for the 
purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”60 
Similarly, the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law 
Enforcement Officials provide that firearms may be used “in self-defence or 
defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury.”  In addi-
tion, however, they permit the use of firearms to “prevent the perpetration of a 
particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person present-
ing such a danger and resisting their authority, and to present such a person from 
escaping.”61  Both the ECHR and the UN Principles make clear that the use of 
deadly force in all instances must be a last resort after the failure of non-forcible 
attempts to resolve the situation, and that there must be no lesser level of force 
that is sufficient to achieve law enforcement aims.  Nonetheless, they authorize 
force beyond situations that involve an imminent threat. 
The permission to use force in situations beyond immediate self-defense or 
defense of others reflects cases in which, as Seumas Miller has put it, “The police 
are morally and legally entitled – and perhaps morally and legally obliged – to 
use lethal force in order to uphold the law.”62  A person who has killed another 
person and is fleeing from the police, for instance, does not pose an imminent 
threat to anyone.  Indeed, he would seem the very opposite of such a threat.  For 
the police to allow him to escape, however, would represent a violation of their 
duty to enforce the law against murder.  It also would allow someone to remain at 
58. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 458. 
59. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 459. 
60. European Convention on Human Rights art. 2(2)(a)-(c), Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005 
[hereinafter ECHR]. 
61. Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (Sept. 7, 1990) [hereinafter U.N. Basic Principles]. 
62. SEUMAS MILLER, SHOOTING TO KILL: THE ETHICS OF POLICE AND MILITARY USE OF LETHAL 
FORCE 123 (2016). 
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large who represents a “standing threat” of grave harm to the public.63  Similarly, 
police who have a dangerous suspect cornered in a building who is attempting to 
leave the country could avoid a threat to themselves and to residents of the juris-
diction by simply getting in their police cars and returning to the station.  To do 
so, however, “would be an abrogation of their legal and moral duty.”64 
Watkin describes this authority to use force beyond the goal of self-defense or 
defense of others as the permission to use force for the purpose of “mission 
accomplishment.”65  The term is drawn from military rules of engagement, which 
authorize force in self-defense and defense of others, as well as in order to accom-
plish the mission of a particular operation.  In broad terms, the mission in the law 
enforcement setting is “to make others desist from illegal activity” and to enforce 
“compliance with the law.”66  Thus, “[t]he person being arrested or escaping only 
has to present a ‘danger’ rather than actually be using or imminently about to use 
force in order for deadly force to be justified.”67  This does not provide authority 
to use force in a manner as expansive as is permitted under IHL, but it does 
authorize force “to protect broader society” not simply to protect individuals.68 
At the same time, it still requires that someone be individually responsible for 
posing a threat. 
What about operations that would result in the unintended but foreseeable 
death of innocent bystanders?  Can a law enforcement framework encompass 
uses of force that result in such harm?  Or is this permissible only under the IHL 
regime?  European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence in cases arising out of 
hostilities between Russia and Chechen rebels suggests that law enforcement 
operations that result in the deaths of innocent persons may be permissible under 
human rights law in some circumstances.  Russia never declared these hostilities 
to constitute armed conflicts, despite significant casualties and damage on both 
sides.  The European Court of Human Rights therefore felt compelled to review 
Russia’s use of force in operations against the rebels under human rights law and 
law enforcement standards. 
In Finogenov v. Russia, the Court reviewed an operation conducted by Russian 
security forces to rescue 900 hostages held by 40 Chechen rebels in a theater in 
Moscow.69  The operation involved pumping an ostensibly non-lethal, narcotic 
gas based on derivatives of phentanyl into the main auditorium of the theater 
through the building’s ventilation system, followed by an assault by security 
forces.  While most of the hostages were rescued and all the terrorists killed, 129 
of the hostages died from effects of the gas. 
63. Id. at 127. 
64. Id. at 126. 
65. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 458. 
66. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 459. 
67. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 460. 
68. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 460. 
69. Finegenov v. Russia, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 365. 
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A suit by relatives of hostages who had died in the incident, and hostages who 
had been injured in it, claimed that Russia used excessive force in the operation 
in violation of the right to life under Article 2 of the ECHR.  Russia acknowl-
edged that “when considering various options for intervention the authorities had 
considered possible losses amongst the hostages, but these had been unavoidable 
in the circumstances.”70  It said that it was impossible to calculate the dosage of 
the gas more precisely than to base it on “the average person’s resistance to it,” 
because of differences in age, physical condition, and medical condition of all 
900 hostages.71 
The Court held that, even though the gas was believed not to be lethal, it was 
“at best, potentially dangerous for an ordinary person, and potentially fatal for a 
weakened person.”72  It therefore was “a primary cause of the death of a 
large number of the victims,” which meant that it implicated the right to life under 
the European Convention.73  The Court accepted that the government was pursu-
ing legitimate aims under Article 2, and said that “[t]he question is whether those 
aims could have been attained by other, less drastic, means.”74 
The Court stated that it had authority in certain circumstances to depart from 
the standard of absolute necessity contained in Article 2 when application of that 
standard “may be simply impossible where certain aspects of the situation lie far 
beyond the Court’s expertise and where the authorities had to act under tremen-
dous time pressure and where their control of the situation was minimal.”75  In 
this case, the Court said: 
The lives of several hundred hostages were at stake, the terrorists were heavily 
armed, well-trained and devoted to their cause and, with regard to the military 
aspect of the storming, no specific preliminary measures could have been 
taken. The hostage-taking came as a surprise for the authorities . . .so the mili-
tary preparations for the storming had to be made very quickly and in full se-
crecy. It should be noted that the authorities were not in control of the situation 
inside the building. In such a situation the Court accepts that difficult and ago-
nising decisions had to be made by the domestic authorities. It is prepared to 
grant them a margin of appreciation, at least in so far as the military and tech-
nical aspects of the situation are concerned, even if now, with hindsight, some 
of the decisions taken by the authorities may appear open to doubt.76 
The Court concluded that “the use of the gas was capable of facilitating the lib-
eration of the hostages and reducing the likelihood of explosion, even if it did not  
70. Id. at 398. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 401. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 405. 
75. Id. at 403. 
76. Id. at 404. 
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remove that risk completely,”77 and that its use during the storming “was not in 
the circumstances a disproportionate measure, and, as such, did not breach 
Article  2 of the Convention.”78  The Court did hold, however, that Russia had 
violated Article 2 of the Convention in planning the operation by failing to pro-
vide for sufficient medical care for persons who foreseeably would need it as a 
result of the operation.79 
This case illustrates the flexibility of human rights law in evaluating uses of 
force that significantly depart from the paradigmatic law enforcement setting. 
The court said that it might be impossible to meet the standard of “absolute neces-
sity,” but it effectively concluded that use of the gas was a reasonable last resort 
under the circumstances.  In this respect, it fit within the law enforcement stand-
ard of necessity. 
In Kerimova v. Russia, the Court was presented with a claim under Article 2 by 
relatives of persons who had been killed in a Russian aerial assault on a town 
held by Chechen insurgents.80  
80. Kerimova v. Russia, App. Nos. 17170/04, 20792/04, 22448/04, 23360/04, 5681/05, and 5684/05, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (Sept. 15, 2011), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22tabview%22:[%22document% 
22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-104662%22]%7D. 
The Court noted that “no martial law or state of 
emergency had ever been declared in the Chechen Republic, and no derogation 
had been made under Article 15 of the Convention. The attacks in question there-
fore have to be examined against a normal legal background.”81  The Court said 
that it was aware of “the difficult situation in the Chechen Republic at the mate-
rial time, which called for exceptional measures on the part of the State to sup-
press the illegal armed insurgency. Those measures could presumably comprise 
the deployment of armed forces equipped with combat weapons, including mili-
tary aircraft.”82  They also, said the Court, “could entail, as a regrettable but 
unavoidable consequence, human casualties.”83  Thus, the Court declared, “the 
obligation to protect the right to life must be interpreted in a way which does not 
impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.”84 
The Court acknowledged that “the town had been occupied by a considerable 
number of well-equipped extremists, armed with a range of large-yield weaponry, 
who were in fact conducting large-scale military actions against the federal 
forces, including attacks on federal aircraft, and had turned the town into a for-
tress.”85  It accepted Russia’s claim that assaulting the town with ground troops 
would have involved “unjustified casualties,”86 and therefore that “Russian 
authorities had no choice other than to carry out aerial strikes in order to be able 
77. Id. at 409. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 412-18. 
81. Id. ¶ 253. 
82. Id. ¶ 246. 
83. Id.   
84. Id. 
85. Id. ¶ 247. 
86. Id. 
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to take over Urus-Martan, and that their actions were in pursuit of one or more of 
the aims set out in paragraph 2 (a) and (c) of Article 2 of the Convention.”87 
The Court concluded, however, that Russia had failed to take sufficient steps 
“to avoid or minimise, to the greatest extent possible, the risk of a loss of life, 
both for persons at whom the measures were directed and for civilians.”88  The 
use of high-explosive fragmentation bombs, said the Court, “in a populated area 
is impossible to reconcile with the degree of caution expected from a law- 
enforcement body in a democratic society.”89 Although Russia was “faced with a 
situation where the population of the town was held hostage by a large group of 
well-equipped and well-trained fighters,” the Court said, “the authorities’ primary 
aim should have been to protect lives from unlawful violence.”90  The indiscrimi-
nate weapons used in the attack were incompatible with this aim. 
As a law enforcement mission, the goal of the Russian military in the situation 
described in Kerimova was to capture or, if need be, kill, the insurgents in order 
to protect the lives of the civilians in the town, subject to requirements of neces-
sity and proportionality.  While the Court held that the use of force in that case 
violated the right to life, the case is notable for accepting that law enforcement 
standards are sufficiently flexible to permit in some cases the use of weapons that 
are more characteristic of engagements during armed conflict than police opera-
tions, which foreseeably could result in loss of innocent life.  This formulation is 
not as permissive as under IHL, which would permit civilian casualties as long as 
they are not “excessive,” because the legitimate state aim is not to subdue the 
enemy but to protect endangered residents.  Nonetheless, it suggests the possibil-
ity of more expansive levels of force than many might expect under human rights 
law. 
The flexibility of human rights law in permitting the use of force in a range of 
situations  makes Watkin comfortable that a default law enforcement approach in 
many cases will provide sufficient authority to respond to threats from non-state 
armed groups, while minimizing the loss of life.  Indeed, he says, if human rights 
law were inflexible and were seen to restrict authority to use force too stringently 
to meet security threats, it would create incentives for states to characterize hostil-
ities as armed conflicts, which would authorize far more extensive violence.91 
Watkin notes that as a practical matter the response to most domestic attacks 
by non-state actors will be guided by law enforcement standards, since first res-
ponders are likely to be police. Furthermore, it can be difficult to know in the 
early stages of an attack who is perpetrating it and how extensive it is.  This is the 
87. Id. ¶ 248. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. ¶ 253. 
90. Id. 
91. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 616. At the same time, he regards much of the European Court of 
Human Rights jurisprudence as applying human rights law in situations in which it would be more 
realistic to acknowledge that the parties were engaged in armed conflict.  See WATKIN, supra note 16, at 
552-59. 
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case even if an incident ultimately may be treated as an attack that is part of an 
armed conflict.92  Improved counterterrorism capabilities on the part of police 
departments, including the availability of specially trained units, enhance the 
likelihood that using force under these standards can be effective in dealing with 
the threat.93  Furthermore, arrest is likely to be a feasible alternative to lethal force 
when responding to domestic attacks, at least in jurisdictions with a reasonably 
well functioning legal system. 
Watkin argues that the presumption of a law enforcement response should also 
apply to threats posed by large-scale criminal organizations capable of engaging 
in substantial violence, whether those threats emanate from inside or outside a 
state.  He notes that these non-state actors now pose significant threats of violence 
in many parts of the world, and engage periodically in large-scale battles with 
state forces.  The intensity of the violence these groups can inflict and their degree 
of organization are sufficient in some cases to support a characterization of 
ongoing hostilities with them as armed conflicts.94 
Watkin maintains, however, that states and the international community should 
be reluctant “to cross the threshold into armed conflict in respect of what is essen-
tially economically driven violence.”95  As he puts it, “The adoption of a ‘war’ 
paradigm . . . should only be considered when it is clear that what is being threat-
ened is the ability of the State to govern and more than a policing response is 
required for the State to succeed.”96  This approach reflects the view that the ex-
pansive permissions to use force under IHL should be available only to respond 
to violence so serious that it threatens the state itself.  Combatting crime, even at 
high levels of violence, is fundamentally about protecting the lives of individual 
citizens, which calls for more restrictive uses of force. 
C. Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict 
Perhaps Watkin’s most notable suggestion is that states involved in armed con-
flicts with non-state groups should use force under human rights and law enforce-
ment standards where this is feasible.  “[T]he categorization of the situation as an 
armed conflict,” he says, “does not demand a conduct of hostilities [IHL] approach. 
The manner of the response remains in the discretion of the State. . . .”97  This 
could mean, for instance, in some cases seeking to capture rather than kill non- 
state combatants or civilians directly participating in hostilities, attempting to 
avoid any civilian casualties when conducting an attack, and adopting rules of 
92. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 597. 
93. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 598. 
94. See, e.g., Julie Lambin, Mexico: Armed Gang Violence Sliding Into Armed Conflict?, WAR REP. 
(Geneva Acad. of Int’l Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Geneva, Switz.), Mar. 2018, at 83 (“In 
2017, Mexico’s security forces were arguably engaged in non-international armed conflicts with at least 
the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco Cartel New Generation. It is important to note that this classification is 
controversial.”). 
95. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 590. 
96. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 590. 
97. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 583. 
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engagement more restrictive than those under IHL.  It could also mean temper-
ing the use of force in ways that incorporate human rights concerns even when 
law enforcement standards are not formally adopted.  Thus, for instance, a state 
might significantly reduce the number of civilian casualties permitted in an attack 
to a level below what would be deemed permissible under IHL proportionality cal-
culations.  In all these cases, a state reserves the right to use force under IHL rules 
but adopts a policy that requires less force in certain circumstances. 
One example of this approach is President Obama’s 2013 Presidential Policy 
Guidance (PPG) on direct action against terrorist targets outside the United 
States.98  
98. Presidential Policy Guidance, Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets, 
Located Outside The United States And Areas of Active Hostilities (May 22, 2013), https://fas.org/irp/ 
offdocs/ppd/ppg-procedures.pdf. 
The U.S. maintains as a legal matter that it is in a global armed conflict 
with Al Qaeda and associated forces that permits it to use force under IHL rules 
wherever members of these groups may be engaged in planning hostilities against 
the U.S.  The PPG, however, provided that the use of lethal force against a target 
located in areas “outside of active hostilities” is permissible only when “the indi-
vidual’s activities pose a continuing imminent threat to U.S. persons,”99 and cap-
ture of the person “is not feasible and no other reasonable alternatives exist to 
effectively address the threat.”100  In addition, there must be “near certainty” of 
the identity and location of the target, and “near certainty that the action can be 
taken without injuring or killing non-combatants.”101 
The PPG thus imposed requirements for the use of force that dreaw signifi-
cantly on human rights concepts.  While a person regarded as a non-state combat-
ant may be targeted under IHL at any time on the basis of status regardless of his 
or her behavior at the time, the PPG made targeting dependent on a person’s con-
duct.  While IHL permits use of force against a permissible target as a first resort, 
the PPG required that capture first must be considered as an option and be deemed 
infeasible before force can be used.  Finally, IHL permits civilian casualties as 
long as they are not “excessive,” while the PPG established the standard of no ci-
vilian casualties.  While the PPG emphasized that the determination of which 
areas are inside or outside of active hostilities is not based on the criteria for an 
armed conflict, the policy reflects the position that operations in locations where 
law enforcement operations may be feasible should attempt to proceed on that ba-
sis if possible even when authority to act under IHL is available. 
In 2017 the Trump administration adopted what has been termed Principles, 
Standards, and Procedures (PSP) that supersede the PPG.102  
102. Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, Trump Poised to Drop Some Limits on Drone Strikes and 
Commando Raids, N.Y. TIMES. (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/politics/ 
trump-drone-strikes-commando-raids-rules.html. 
While the text of 
PSP has not been released, the document reportedly preserves the distinction 
between areas of active hostilities and those outside them, and adopts a 
99. Id. at 11. 
100. Id. at 1. 
101. Id. 
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requirement of reasonable certainty that no civilians will be harmed.103  
103. Michael J. Adams & Ryan Goodman, “Reasonable Certainty” vs. “Near Certainty” in Military 
Targeting–What the Law Requires, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/52343/ 
reasonable-certainty-vs-near-certainty-military-targeting-what-law-requires/. 
The PSP 
purportedly revise the criterion for direct action against individuals outside areas 
of active hostilities so that they need not pose a continuing, imminent threat. 
Instead, targets may be persons who play key roles within terrorist networks 
whose removal can disrupt those networks.104  
104. Luke Hartig, Trump’s New Drone Strike Policy: What’s Any Different? Why It Matters, JUST 
SECURITY (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/45227/trumps-drone-strike-policy-different- 
matters/. 
This standard is more expansive 
than human rights law.  Maintaining the goal of avoiding civilian casualties, how-
ever, and the requirement that capture be infeasible, effectively preserves impor-
tant elements of human rights law.  In this respect, the principles first enunciated 
in the PPG reflect the use of policy to limit the use of force compared to what a 
state asserts it has legal authority to do.105 
105. For discussions of the PSP and international law, see Adriana Edmeades Jones, Implications of 
Trump’s New Drone Policy for Countries Assisting the US, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www. 
justsecurity.org/47011/implications-trumps-drone-policy-countries-assisting-u-s/; Monica Hakimi, Three 
Half-Truths on U.S. Lethal Operations and Policy Constraints, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 25, 2017), https:// 
www.justsecurity.org/45315/half-truths-u-s-lethal-operations-policy-constraints/. 
Watkin notes that the policy of police primacy emerged from counterinsur-
gency campaigns, the success of which depends significantly on convincing local 
populations that the government is capable of providing security for the popula-
tion and takes seriously the obligation to protect the lives of innocent civilians. 
Thus, for instance, General McChrystal, commander of the NATO International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, issued a directive in July 2009 
that placed stringent limits on the ability of ground forces to call in close air sup-
port (CAS) for operations involving residential compounds.106  
106. N. Atl. Treaty Org. [NATO], International Security Assistance Force Tactical Directive (July 6, 
2009), https://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf. 
These limits 
reflected policy constraints that voluntarily restricted the use of force more than 
IHL would ordinarily permit in the armed conflict in Afghanistan. The Directive 
said that “commanders must weigh the gain of using CAS against the cost of ci-
vilian casualties, which in the long run make mission success more difficult and 
turn the Afghan people against us.”107  It also provided that ISAF forces could not 
enter or fire upon, or fire into a mosque or any religious or historical site except in 
self-defense.  “[W]e must respect and protect the population from coercion and 
violence,” the Directive said, “and operate in a manner which will win their 
support.”108 
The Directive generated some criticism that it placed ISAF forces at unreason-
able risk, and was modified by McChrystal’s successor.  This reflects the fact that 
the feasibility of particular voluntary restrictions on the use of force may be a sub-
ject of debate, and that situations may evolve in ways that make them less or 
107. Id. at *2. 
108. Id. at *1. 
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more acceptable.  Nonetheless, that debate may be over where on a continuum 
rules of engagement should be located, rather than over whether the use of force 
should be based on human rights law or IHL. 
Watkin suggests that the rules of engagement in the second battle of Fallujah 
in Iraq in November 2004 reflected a hybrid approach that eschewed full IHL per-
missions but permitted greater force than a strict human rights approach would 
allow.109  By that point, the insurgency by both Sunni and Shi’ite forces had 
resulted in hostilities significant enough to constitute a NIAC governed by IHL, 
and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had affiliated with Al Qaeda so that his group became 
Al Qaeda in Iraq in October of that year.  US Marines were given the order to re- 
take Fallujah from insurgents, who were heavily armed with military-grade 
weapons and had erected substantial defensive fortifications around the town. 
Civilians were given the opportunity to leave the town before the assault, which 
most of them did. 
Authorization to use force under IHL based simply on the status of persons as 
enemy combatants is provided by rules of engagement in which certain forces are 
“declared hostile.”  The rules for the assault on Fallujah, however, stated, “no 
forces are declared hostile.”110  Instead, Watkin says, the rules provided authority 
to use force mainly in self-defense.  This permits force against someone who 
engages in “hostile action” or who exhibits “hostile intent.”  Such a focus on con-
duct rather than status resembles law enforcement standards for the use of force. 
At the same time, however, forces were authorized to treat anyone who was car-
rying arms as demonstrating hostile intent, even if they were not engaged in the 
act of firing or preparing to fire.111  Permission to shoot persons on sight who car-
ried weapons was a departure from policing rules that require more specific evi-
dence of a likely attack before lethal force can be used. 
The Fallujah ROE thus were more restrictive than IHL but more expansive 
than what law enforcement standards would authorize.  Watkin suggests that the 
restrictions were based on two considerations.  The first is the difficulty in identi-
fying non-state actors who are combatants who can be shot on sight based on their 
status.  For this reason, the rules incorporated a standard based on conduct. 
Second, the battle took place in an urban setting in the context of a counterinsur-
gency campaign, which resulted in an effort to limit civilian casualties and dam-
age as much as possible.  At the same time, as Watkin notes, the ROE were 
sufficient to “sustain the use of tank main gunfire, mortar fire, artillery, and close 
air support in combat that resulted in the death of an estimated 1,200 insur-
gents.”112  Notwithstanding ROE based on self-defense, “the U.S. military was 
engaged in an armed conflict against determined insurgent forces.”113 
109. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 476-79. 
110. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 476. 
111. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 476. 
112. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 477. 
113. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 477. 
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Watkin emphasizes that the primacy of a law enforcement approach is depend-
ent on its feasibility in various settings.  Several factors are relevant to the deter-
mination of feasibility, including: 
[T]he capabilities of State security forces; geography, including distances 
involved; the organization and potential scale of violence threatened by the 
terrorist or insurgent group; the degree of control that can be exercised by the 
affected State security forces over the immediate area of operations; and 
the risks to the soldiers involved and to civilians living in proximity to such 
action.114 
Watkin regards effective control over territory as an especially important con-
sideration in determining if state forces are in a position to follow policing rather 
than armed conflict rules on the use of force.  As he observes, “[t]he conduct of 
physical surveillance, tracking of suspects, and the carrying out of arrests is often 
directly tied to the ability to control the territory where such operations are to be 
conducted.”115  If there is not such control, the risks in proceeding according to 
law enforcement standards may be significant enough that “a more robust 
response is required.”116 
It is worth emphasizing that Watkin’s approach to the potential incorporation 
of human rights standards into armed conflict operations as a matter of policy dif-
fers from the admonition that forces should use a least-restrictive means (LRM) 
standard in using force against enemy combatants in armed conflict.  One source 
that expresses this approach is the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) 2009 Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities.117 
117. NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF 
DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009), https:// 
www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf. 
Section IX of that document declares, “The kind and degree of force which is per-
missible against persons not entitled to protection against direct attack must not 
exceed what is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in 
the prevailing circumstances.”118  This principle draws inspiration from former 
ICRC Vice-President Jean Pictet’s suggestion that “‘[i]f we can put a soldier out 
of action by capturing him, we should not wound him; if we can obtain the same 
result by wounding him, we must not kill him. If there are two means to achieve 
the same military advantage, we must choose the one which causes the lesser 
evil.’”119   
114. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 606-07. 
115. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 550. 
116. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 550. 
118. Id. at 77. 
119. Id. at 82 n.221 (quoting JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 75 (1985)). 
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The Guidance describes this requirement as imposed by the IHL principles of 
necessity and humanity, rather than human rights law,120 but it seems nonetheless 
to be informed by recent greater attention to human rights concerns in armed con-
flict.  The ICRC acknowledges that it is unlikely that this requirement will be fea-
sible in conventional battlefield settings, and that it is most likely to apply “where 
a party to the conflict exercises effective territorial control, most notably in occu-
pied territories and non-international armed conflicts.”121 
Ryan Goodman has drawn on the ICRC Guidance to argue on behalf of the 
LRM principle, but suggests that there is “no substantial precedent” for limiting it 
to situations in which forces exercise effective control over a territory.122  He 
grounds the principle instead primarily on the protection provided to combatants 
who are hors de combat.  Under IHL, he says, “the legal right to use armed force 
is limited to the objective of rendering individuals hors de combat (taken out of 
battle) or, in the collective sense, to defeating enemy forces.”123  Goodman 
says, “In some circumstances, it is thus unlawful to use lethal force when a 
fighter could clearly be rendered hors de combat just as easily – and without 
endangering the attacking party – by injury or capture rather than death. This 
rule is embodied in the prohibition on superfluous injury and unnecessary suf-
fering.”124  Furthermore, he notes, Article 41(2)(a) of Additional Protocol I 
(AP I) to the Geneva Conventions provides that a person is hors de combat 
when “he is in the power of an adverse Party.”125  This can occur in circumstan-
ces short of surrender when combatants “no longer have the means to defend 
themselves” and are “at the mercy of their adversary.”126 
Watkin maintains that, notwithstanding any suggestion that the LRM require-
ment does not depend upon control over the area of military operations, the exis-
tence of such control in fact is an essential prerequisite for the applicability of the 
obligation.  “[C]ontrol and risk (to both soldiers and civilians),” he says, “are inti-
mately intertwined.”127 Thus, decisions to capture rather than kill are dependent 
on “security forces being able to exert significant levels of physical control over 
the immediate area where the incident occurs.”128  This control need not be abso-
lute, he argues, which reflects his view that commanders will need to make all- 
things-considered assessments of the feasibility of following a law enforcement 
rather than armed conflict approach to the use of force in particular situations. 
The need for such intensely contextual determinations is why Watkin is more 
comfortable suggesting that proceeding on the basis of law enforcement 
120. Id. at 82 n.222. 
121. Id. at 81. 
122. Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 819, 827 
(2013). 
123. Id. at 822. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 832. 
126. Id. at 836. 
127. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 223. 
128. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 223. 
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standards regarding the use of force against combatants in armed conflict should 
be a matter of policy rather than a legal obligation.129  Furthermore, he regards 
the scenario depicted by the LRM approach as having much less practical signifi-
cance than the risk posed to civilians by military operations in situations in which 
they are difficult to distinguish from combatants.130  His proposal to default to a 
law enforcement approach even in armed conflict thus might be characterized as 
an effort to give full effect to Article 57(1) of AP I’s requirement that “constant 
care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian 
objects.”131  That directive is contained in the Article devoted to “Precautions in 
Attack,” which explicitly provides for contextual judgments about what precau-
tions are feasible in light of the need to achieve military objectives.  A policy of 
defaulting to law enforcement standards whenever circumstances permit is a way 
of operationalizing this obligation in a way that can structure the exercise of dis-
cretion.  By establishing a presumption, it signals a preferred approach; by mak-
ing that presumption rebuttable, it provides flexibility to adjust based on 
conditions on the ground. 
D. Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations 
Finally, a notable aspect of Watkin’s police primacy approach is that a state 
that conducts self-defense operations in another state may owe basic human 
rights obligations to the residents of that territory.132  This is the case even if the 
state cannot be characterized as conducting an occupation of the territory for pur-
poses of Geneva Convention IV.  Particularly when a state conducts extraterrito-
rial operations based on the inability of another state to address a threat to the 
former, “the threatened State could be viewed as operating in the place of the ter-
ritorial State.”133  While such operations would not trigger all the obligations of 
governance, a state should be required to “carry out a role involving a special 
trust toward uninvolved civilians of the enemy of any other State during cross- 
border deployments against non-State actors.”134  Watkin counsels that the nature 
of a state’s obligations will depend upon what it is feasible to do under the cir-
cumstances, but at a minimum “the value attributed to human life must be the 
same regardless of whether civilians live inside or outside a threatened State.”135 
Watkin suggests that, “[b]ased on human rights norms,” it is immaterial whether 
this obligation arises from human rights law or IHL.136 
129. For an extended critique of the least restrictive means test, see Corn, Blank, Jenks & Jensen, 
supra note 47. 
130. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 232. 
131. Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 57. 
132. This is consistent with the focus on the extent to which IHL reflects what might be called “civilian 
protection law” with respect to its provisions relating to civilians.  See Maj. Richard M. Whitaker, Civilian 
Protection Law in Military Operations: An Essay, ARMY LAWYER, Nov. 1996, at 3, 7. 
133. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 608. 
134. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 609. 
135. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 609. 
136. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 610. 
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Watkin says that “in looking at the concept of control, care must be taken to 
avoid extreme interpretations of the law that suggest human rights jurisdiction 
extends to the outermost range of a weapon system . . . The problem is that these 
approaches appear divorced from the reality of attempting to operationalize the 
rights involved.”137 Presumably, he would say that a state has obligations under 
human rights law when it exercises a certain degree of control of an area, even for 
the purposes of a single cross-border operation rather than a more extended occu-
pation, but when it does not its human rights obligations flow from IHL. 
E. Conclusion 
Watkin’s emphasis on sensitivity to operational reality thus leads him to argue 
that states’ use of force should be guided as a default matter by law enforcement 
standards reflecting human rights norms, unless circumstances make this infeasi-
ble.  This is the case even if an operation occurs in the course of an armed con-
flict.  Such an approach counsels restricting the use of force whenever possible. 
At the same time, his focus on the operational level means that determining the 
rules that regulate the use of force in a given instance “must include an assess-
ment of whether a policing approach will realistically enable the threatened State 
to counter the violence posed by the non-State actor.”138 
Watkin does not explicitly distinguish between IACs and NIACs in proposing 
his police primacy approach.  His emphasis on contextual considerations suggests 
that the identity of the participants in hostilities is less significant than the nature 
of those hostilities.  At the same time, NIACs are more likely to involve differen-
tiated situations in which reliance on law enforcement standards sometimes may 
be feasible.  Furthermore, Watkin devotes considerable attention to describing 
the challenges posed by the involvement of non-state actors in hostilities, which 
may indicate that his main focus is on NIACs. 
This focus on NIACs is reflected in Watkin’s suggestion that the test for when 
such a conflict exists should move beyond what many currently regard as two cri-
teria to a broader, more flexible, standard that takes into account “the totality of 
the circumstances.”139  As the next section discusses, he argues that this approach 
in some cases may lead to the characterization of a relatively brief but intensive 
engagement as a limited-duration armed conflict. 
III. IDENTIFYING NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 
A. Totality of the Circumstances 
While Watkin argues for a police primacy approach, he makes clear that “a re-
alistic professional assessment” must occur on an ongoing basis to determine 
“whether the restrictions arising from the adoption of a law enforcement  
137. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 230. 
138. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 367. 
139. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 363-69. 
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approach are too operationally limiting.”140 When this is the case within an 
ongoing armed conflict, there should be consideration whether it is appropriate to 
revert to use of force governed by IHL rules.  When this occurs outside of an 
armed conflict, Watkin suggests that there should be consideration at an appropri-
ate level of authority whether circumstances warrant characterization of hostil-
ities as having escalated to the level of an armed conflict. 
Watkin argues that what many commonly regard as the current test for deter-
mining the existence of a NIAC fails to take into account all factors relevant to 
such a determination.  That putative test focuses on the intensity of the violence 
and whether the armed groups have a sufficient level of organization to be 
regarded as parties to a conflict.141  Language in Prosecutor v. Tadic also suggests 
that the violence be “protracted,” although it is unclear exactly how much weight 
should be given to this consideration.142  Watkin maintains that “[t]here is a dan-
ger that by focusing too much on the actions and organization of a non-State actor 
armed group,” the conventional test fails to consider the level of force that is nec-
essary for a state to respond effectively to a threat.143  Drawing on Geoff Corn’s 
concept of a “transnational armed conflict” between a state and a transnational 
non-state group, he argues that the means that the state regards as necessary to 
engage effectively in hostilities should also be an important consideration in an 
analysis that considers the “totality of the circumstances.”144 
Watkin’s critique is consistent with Laurie Blank and Geoff Corn’s argument 
that the factors articulated in Tadic have unjustifiably come to be regarded as a 
two-part test in which each element must be independently satisfied.145  Blank and 
Corn point out, for instance, that an early report by the UN Commission of Inquiry 
for Syria relied on this approach in its conclusion that the situation in Syria did not 
constitute an armed conflict. “While the commission is gravely concerned that the 
violence in certain areas may have reached the requisite level of intensity,” the 
Commission said, “it was unable to verify that the Free Syrian Army (FSA), local 
groups identifying themselves as such or other anti-Government armed groups  
140. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 594. 
141. See Int’l Law Ass’n, Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law, at 2 
(2010). 
142. Prosecutor v Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).  As Noam Lubell 
describes the uncertainty, “There is some debate on how to interpret the notion of “protracted,” as 
discussed initially in Tadic´ and revisited in Haradinaj, including whether “protracted” would always 
require a lengthy time period (which could be problematic if extremely high levels of violence break out 
early on), or whether it should be read as indicative of intensity, with the latter being the key criterion.” 
Noam Lubell, Fragmented Wars: Multi-Territorial Military Operations Against Armed Groups, 93 
INT’L L. STUD. 215, 242 n.77 (2017). 
143. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 376. 
144. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 376.  For Corn’s formulation, see Geoffrey Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, 
and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 295 (2007). 
145. Blank & Corn, supra note 20, at 696. 
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had reached the necessary level of organization.”146 
This approach, Blank and Corn argue, is inconsistent with the intent of 
Common Article 3 to mitigate as much as possible the suffering of persons unin-
volved in hostilities between state and non-state armed groups.  The 1952 ICRC 
Commentary to this Article listed a few factors relevant to whether a NIAC 
exists, but then said, “Does this mean that Article 3 is not applicable in cases 
where armed strife breaks out in a country, but does not fulfil any of the above 
conditions (which are not obligatory and are only mentioned as an indication)? 
We do not subscribe to this view. We think, on the contrary, that the Article 
should be applied as widely as possible.”147  Blank and Corn believe that a “total-
ity of the circumstances” approach is more faithful to this purpose of Common 
Article 3.  Finally, reliance on only two criteria is inconsistent with Article 1 of 
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.  While intended to apply only to NIACs 
of a certain intensity, this provision sets forth several factors that determine 
whether a NIAC exists that is subject to that Protocol.148 
In light of these considerations, Watkin suggests that the criteria for a NIAC 
should include: 
[T]he degree of organization of the group (hierarchical, horizontal, cellular, or 
“hybrid”); how that group conducts its operations (e.g., the tactics used); the 
weapons used in an attack, including explosives such as grenades, IEDs, 
rocket-propelled grenades, suicide belts; and the type of State security forces, 
weapons, tactics, and so forth reasonably required to defeat the threat (e.g., 
missiles, mortars, heavy weapons, airpower—meaning that State armed forces 
have to engage in “combat”).149 
B. Discrete Engagements as NIAC 
Watkin says that taking account of the totality of the circumstances may lead 
to the conclusion that some engagements with non-state groups should be 
regarded as constituting intense but brief periods of armed conflict.  The Inter- 
American Human Rights Commission decision in Abella v. Argentina provides 
some support for this position.  The Court in that case found that a thirty-hour bat-
tle between soldiers and an armed group attacking a military barracks constituted 
an armed conflict because of the military-grade weapons that were used by both 
sides and the intensity of the violence.150  
150. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/ 
II.98 doc. 6 rev. ¶¶ 155-56 (1997), http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/97eng/Argentina11137.htm. 
Watkin argues that this reflects a 
146. U.N. Gen. Assembly, Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/69 (Feb. 22, 2012). 
147. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY I GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE 
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 50 (Jean 
S. Pictet ed., 1952). 
148. Additional Protocol II, supra note 30. 
149. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 583. 
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realistic assessment of whether a law enforcement approach “will realistically 
enable the threatened State to counter the violence posed by the non-State 
actor.”151  He notes: 
[I]t is difficult to see how the violence associated with the Abella v. Argentina 
case (i.e., 30 hours), the 2000 Sierra Leone hostage rescue (4 hours), the 
hijacked aircraft September 11, 2001, attacks (21 to 45 minutes), the 
November 26–28, 2008, Mumbai attack (60 hours), the September 11, 2012, 
attack on the U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi (i.e., 13 hours), the 
September 21–24, 2013, Kenyan Westgate Mall attack (i.e., 80 hours), or the 
2015 Paris assaults (3 hours) does not factually take on the attributes of an 
armed conflict and can only be dealt with by means of human rights–based law 
enforcement. . . . Whether a “one off” short term conflict, or the extension of 
an existing one from outside the borders of a State the nature of violence is the 
same.152 
“Most of these intense attacks,” notes Watkin, “involved non-State actor use of 
weapons and levels of violence ordinarily associated with warfare.”153  For this 
reason, “an armed conflict can be in existence even during limited self-defense 
operations.”154  The ICRC Updated Commentaries for Geneva Conventions I & 
II, published after Watkin’s book, accepts this view, stating that “hostilities of 
only a brief duration may still reach the intensity level of a non-international 
armed conflict if, in a particular case, there are other indicators of hostilities of a 
sufficient intensity to require and justify such an assessment.”155 
Watkin acknowledges potential concern that consideration of the level of force 
that a state considers necessary may provide too much discretion to determine the 
nature of the hostilities in which it is engaged, with the attendant temptation to 
“overreact in its application of combat power.”156  He emphasizes that “there 
must be a rational connection between the security situation . . . and the methods 
used before force can be justified as an armed conflict response.”157   An approach 
that takes this consideration into account, he suggests, “would be enhanced by a 
clearer indication of what level of threat or circumstances justifies a State 
response with combat forces applying a conduct of hostilities approach.”158 
Watkin also admits that recognition of what he describes as a “lower conflict 
threshold” is inconsistent with interpretations of international law that aim to 
limit the violence connected with State cross-border use of force as much as 
151. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 367. 
152. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 367-69. 
153. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 369. 
154. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 417. 
155. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY I GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE 
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 159 
(Knut Do¨rmann et al. eds., 2016) 
156. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 355. 
157. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 599. 
158. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 355. 
2019] USE OF FORCE ACROSS THE THREAT CONTINUUM 199 
possible.159  He argues, however, that contemporary violence is already requiring 
changes in “traditional views of the law, such as States not being permitted to 
exercise self-defense against non-State actors not attributable to a State. . . .”160 
The goal, he says, should be to match standards for the use of force to operational 
reality. 
In some cases, this may mean responding to even elevated levels of violence 
within a law enforcement framework that provides some measure of flexibility. 
In other cases, it may mean using that framework even when there is authority to 
operate under IHL standards.  In still other cases, it will require acknowledging as 
a practical matter that armed conflict rules are necessary in order to respond to 
non-state violence in a discrete engagement, even if that engagement is not part 
of a protracted course of hostilities.  Moving beyond reliance on two discrete cri-
teria in identifying a NIAC, he argues, will provide more realistic guidance while 
still giving states the option to restrict their use of force in response to a threat. 
C. Assessment 
Watkin’s support for a totality of the circumstances approach in identifying a 
NIAC has some appeal as consistent with the underlying purpose of Common 
Article 3.  Indeed, Blank and Corn observe that in elaborating on indicia of inten-
sity and organization, courts have suggested a broad range of considerations that 
are relevant in identifying a NIAC.161  In the ICTY decision in Prosecutor v. 
Haradinaj, for instance, the court noted: 
Trial Chambers have relied on indicative factors relevant for assessing the ‘in-
tensity’ criterion, none of which are, in themselves, essential to establish that 
the criterion is satisfied. These indicative factors include the number, duration 
and intensity of individual confrontations; the type of weapons and other mili-
tary equipment used; the number and calibre of munitions fired; the number of 
persons and type of forces partaking in the fighting; the number of casualties; 
the extent of material destruction; and the number of civilians fleeing combat 
zones.162 
These are useful considerations to take into account.  Blank and Corn nonethe-
less suggest that, “notwithstanding the relevance of any one or more of the vari-
ous subfactors the cases have identified, the effect of a factor-based analysis for 
intensity and organization has only served to solidify the idea of a strict elements 
test for the definition of armed conflict.”163 
One important concern about a totality of the circumstances test, however, is 
whether its open-ended nature sufficiently constrains state decision-making. 
159. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 369. 
160. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 370. 
161. Blank & Corn, supra note 20, at 722. 
162. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84, Judgment, ¶ 49 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008). 
163. Blank & Corn, supra note 20, at 724. 
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Recall that Watkin advises that IHL should apply only “when it is clear that what 
is being threatened is the ability of the State to govern.”164  To say the least, states 
have been known to decide very quickly that various forms of civil unrest and vi-
olence pose a threat to the state that must be met with substantial levels of force. 
Reliance on an all-things-considered standard for determining the existence of a 
NIAC could make it more difficult to challenge this conclusion than use of the 
two-part test that Watkin and others criticize.  The criteria of intensity and level 
of organization arguably provide a more structured framework for analysis and 
debate, whose terms still require the type of flexible interpretation that the court 
conducted in Haradinaj.  In this way, the requirement to make a persuasive claim 
with respect to these specific criteria may better constrain state tendencies to 
expand the use of force in the face of challenges to authority. 
One might also question whether a totality of the circumstances standard 
should be used to characterize discrete engagements as NIACs.  As Watkin has 
noted, jurisprudence suggests that human rights law provides considerable flexi-
bility for security forces to adjust their use of force to substantial intense levels of 
violence.  After all, the hostilities between Russia and Chechen rebels as an em-
pirical matter constituted armed conflicts under any definition of the term, even if 
Russia never acknowledged them as such.  The European Court of Human Rights 
nonetheless applied human rights law to those conflicts in a way that provided rel-
atively expansive permissions to use force that included, for instance, the use of 
military weapons and aerial bombing.  The Court also acknowledged that in such 
operations civilian casualties might be unavoidable and justified. 
The Court did conclude in cases such as Finogenov, Kerimova, and Isayeva 
that Russia had not taken sufficient precautions to minimize the loss of civilian 
lives to satisfy its obligation under the ECHR.  Is it necessary to make it easier to 
declare an armed conflict if human rights law has the capability to permit state 
forces to deal effectively with security threats on this scale while imposing rea-
sonable limits on the use of force? 
As Watkin notes, however, notwithstanding the flexibility of human rights law, 
its criteria of necessity and proportionality are fundamentally different from those 
of IHL.  Necessity under human rights law requires that force be used only as a 
last resort in response to a threat posed by a specific individual, while IHL neces-
sity requires simply that force be used to achieve a military advantage.  Human 
rights law thus would entail application of the least-restrictive means test 
described above, which mandates capture of combatants instead of the use of le-
thal force when this option is feasible.  A traditional understanding of IHL would 
not include this requirement. 
Furthermore, human rights proportionality requires that the harm caused by the 
use of force be proportionate to the harm that this force seeks to prevent.  In other 
words, the state should use no more force than is necessary.  IHL proportionality, 
by contrast, requires a determination of whether civilian harms are excessive in 
164. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 590. 
2019] USE OF FORCE ACROSS THE THREAT CONTINUUM 201 
comparison to the military advantage that the use of force is meant to obtain.  As 
Watkin notes, that principle “does not deal with the proportionality of a response 
in relation to the threat unless objectively the attacks may cause unnecessary suf-
fering or superfluous injury.”165  During armed conflict, security forces “may use 
an overwhelming, indeed disproportionate response against a lawful target.”166 
Thus, “human rights law and humanitarian law give fundamentally different 
answers to the question of when state agents can use lethal force.”167  Put differ-
ently, human rights law proportionality aims to protect the deliberate object of 
state violence, while IHL proportionality seeks to protect innocent victims from 
excessive unintended harm. 
Watkin illustrates the difference in his analysis of the European Court of 
Human Rights decision in Isayeva v. Russia II, which involved Russia’s use of 
aerial attacks, tanks, and rocket-launchers against Chechen rebels entrenched in 
Katyr-Yurt, a town of about 25,000 persons.168  The Court held that Russia had 
violated the ECHR right to life because of its “massive use of indiscriminate 
weapons.”169  Watkin notes that the Court used language that resembles the IHL 
principle of precaution in its reference to Russia’s failure “to take all feasible pre-
cautions in the choice of means and methods” in order to minimize loss of civil-
ian life.170  As he points out, however, the Court defined its task as to determine 
whether the force that was used in the attack was “no more than absolutely neces-
sary for achieving the declared purpose” under the ECHR.171  The Court 
described that purpose in this way: “Even when faced with a situation where, as 
the Government submit, the population of the village had been held hostage by a 
large group of well-equipped and well-trained fighters, the primary aim of the 
operation should be to protect lives from unlawful violence.”172  The purpose of 
the operation thus was to protect individual lives, not to protect the state. 
Had the rebels, for instance, begun vacating the town, Russia arguably could 
use only the level of force necessary to ensure that they did not pose a threat to 
the town’s residents – not necessarily the level of force necessary to defeat the 
rebels.  By contrast, the aim of using force in armed conflict is to protect the state. 
Had the situation been characterized in this way, Russia could have attacked the 
fleeing rebels, and could have caused civilian deaths while doing so, as long as 
the number of such deaths was not excessive compared to the value of defeating 
the rebels.  It might be possible to analogize fleeing rebels to a fleeing violent 
felon in the sense that each represents an ongoing threat if allowed to escape. 
The basis for treating the latter person as dangerous, however, is his or her prior 
165. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 554. 
166. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 554. 
167. Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 1888. 
168. Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 24, 2005). 
169. Id. ¶ 191. 
170. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 554.  The passage to which Watkin refers is at ¶176 in the Court’s 
opinion. 
171. Isayeva, App. No. 57950/00 ¶ 181. 
172. Id. ¶191. 
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individual behavior.  By contrast, treating all retreating rebels as dangerous 
would rest on their membership in a collective rather than on what each individ-
ual has specifically done.  This is more akin to the status-based liability to force 
under IHL than liability based on individual responsibility that characterizes 
human rights law. 
Thus, as Watkin puts it, “the adherence to human rights standards suggests a 
much more restrictive approach toward controlling State action during what is 
clearly an armed conflict.”173 Of course, in this situation, the application of these 
standards was a result of Russia’s refusal to treat hostilities as constituting an 
armed conflict, rather than an overly stringent threshold for finding the existence 
of such a conflict.  Nonetheless, Watkin’s concern is that a failure in some cir-
cumstances to consider the totality of the circumstances in assessing whether an 
armed conflict exists will result in a poor fit between the force necessary to 
respond effectively to a threat and the law that governs the use of force. 
Watkin is concerned not only that human rights law may be too restrictive in 
some circumstances, but that it may become more expansive than it should if it is 
consistently applied to what for all intents and purposes are armed conflicts.  “In 
order to apply human rights law to govern the use of force in armed conflict,” he 
says, “[a] court will become increasingly driven to adopt humanitarian law 
standards.”174 
He notes, for example, that a UK operation to rescue hostages from a non-state 
armed gang in Sierra Leone in 2000 involved “the air insertion of a Special 
Forces squadron, a Parachute Regiment company, support from helicopter gun-
ships, and indirect mortar fire . . . which anticipate[d] and result[ed] in an exten-
sive firefight against an organized armed group armed with weapons of war.”175 
Any attempt to characterize that engagement as a law enforcement operation, 
Watkin says, strains credibility.  It also risks diluting the protections of human 
rights law in order to accommodate state interests that are distinctive to armed 
conflict, which are not easily analogized to the paradigm of the cop on the beat. 
This is a point that I will address in more detail below in discussing whether we 
should continue to rely on the categories of human rights law and IHL to guide 
our judgments about the use of force. 
In sum, Watkin argues for the opportunity to apply criteria for an armed con-
flict to specific incidents that more faithfully reflect operational realities in the 
use of force.  He regards one benefit of this as avoiding the possibility that the use 
of law enforcement standards will not unduly restrict the ability to respond to 
threats that require significantly more force than that regulatory regime contem-
plates.  A second benefit is that a more realistic test for identifying an armed 
173. See also Blank & Corn, supra note 20, at 699 (“Human rights law–the exclusive source of 
international legal regulation applicable in the absence of an armed conflict–simply does not 
contemplate massive uses of military power and therefore does not provide an effective regulatory 
framework for such use.”). 
174. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 556. 
175. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 577. 
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conflict can help preserve the integrity of human rights law by avoiding the dilu-
tion of its protections and basic commitments. 
It is certainly true that human rights law proceeds from different premises than 
IHL.  The aim of the state in the former is to protect individual lives, while the lat-
ter is to protect the state by defeating an enemy.  Most of the situations that 
Watkin suggests could be characterized as limited duration armed conflicts, how-
ever, would seem to be ones in which extensive use of force would be authorized 
by law enforcement as self-defense and defense of others, as well as what Watkin 
describes as the principle of law enforcement “mission accomplishment.”  They 
would also seem to be cases in which the state could make a declaration of a tem-
porary period of emergency without the need to declare an armed conflict. 
Indeed, a derogation might not even be necessary under the European 
Convention in light of Article 2’s provision that an arbitrary deprivation of life 
does not occur if no more force than is absolutely necessary is used “for the pur-
pose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”176 
In Abella v. Argentina, for instance, the use of military-grade force would be 
justified in self-defense against attackers who were using such weapons to storm 
the military barracks.  Self-defense also would justify the use of a substantial 
amount of force in responding to the use of fire from automatic weapons, mortars, 
and rocket-propelled grenades in the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi. 
The attacks in Mumbai, on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, and in Paris in 
November 2015 all involved sophisticated operations using military-grade weap-
ons that would justify the use of intense force in response as measures in self- 
defense and defense of others, as well as measures akin to those aimed at quelling 
serious violent disorder or insurrection. 
The Sierra Leone and Entebbe hostage rescue missions represent instances in 
which significant force could be necessary in order to accomplish the mission of 
rescuing the hostages.177 As Watkin notes, for instance, non-combatant evacua-
tions may evolve such that “an elevated level of threat is posed by blocking 
organized armed groups. In such situations a more proactive use of force than 
simply acting in self-defense may be required to carry out the evacuation of the 
nationals.  That authority would have to be found in mission accomplishment 
ROE.”178 Human rights law could authorize a substantial level of force in these 
cases, but it would not, for instance, authorize Israeli rescue forces to seek out 
and bomb Ugandan military bases in the Entebbe operation if this were not neces-
sary to free the hostages at the airport. 
The 9/11 airplane hijacking attacks present a more complicated case.  Human 
rights law would certainly authorize whatever force was necessary to subdue the 
hijackers, and likely would accept that any deaths of innocent persons that 
176. ECHR, supra note 60, art. 2(2). 
177. Watkin regards the hostilities at Entebbe as an IAC because of the engagement between Israeli 
and Ugandan forces.  WATKIN, supra note 16, at 408-09. 
178. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 463. 
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occurred during that operation would be justified.  It is a more difficult question 
whether it would have permitted U.S. forces intentionally to destroy a hijacked 
plane in the air.  It may be that it would be necessary to invoke IHL in order to 
engage in such an operation.  I discuss this issue in more detail below when I 
describe the German Federal Constitutional Court reviewing German legislation 
that authorized such destruction.179  In any event, while the scenario is a difficult 
one, those presented in the other situations are far more common.  As I have 
described, in each of these cases human rights law likely would authorize the 
amount of force necessary to address the threat, while avoiding the expansive per-
missions provided by IHL. 
Aside from the potential of human rights law to accommodate an elevated level 
of force in a discrete engagement, there may be reason to limit armed conflicts to 
hostilities that are ongoing in at least some sense.  This need not mean that there 
must be a succession of battles as in a conventional war; periodic ongoing erup-
tions of violence may be sufficient in some cases.  There should, however, be an 
understanding that an engagement in some way is part of a larger set of hostilities. 
What we think of as “peacetime” is punctuated by intermittent outbursts of vio-
lence, often intense in nature.  The ability to characterize each of these as individ-
ual armed conflicts may create too much temptation for a state to use them as the 
occasion for using military force. 
One might argue that the ability to designate temporary engagements as armed 
conflict is important not simply to provide more expansive permissions to use 
force, but to use IHL to provide individuals with protections against egregious 
misuses of force.180  
180. Adil Haque relies on this concern to argue that the criteria for a NIAC should be essentially the 
same as the minimal criteria for an international armed conflict. See Adil Ahmad Haque, Triggers and 
Thresholds of Non-International Armed Conflict, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www. 
justsecurity.org/33222/triggers-thresholds-non-international-armed-conflict/. 
Blank and Corn articulate this view in their argument that 
the process of determining whether a NIAC exists should take into account the 
nature of the state’s use of force.  This is especially important, they argue, in order 
to identify situations in which dissident groups may be vulnerable to state use of 
massive military force in order to repress opposition.  As they note: 
[W]hat history seems to demonstrate repeatedly is that states almost always 
tend to err on the side of aggressiveness when they feel threatened by dissident 
movements.  This is unsurprising. A state seeking to preserve its warrant will 
almost always perceive even a nascent and poorly organized armed opposition 
movement as a critical national security challenge. From an operational and 
tactical perspective, it is often precisely at this point in the threat evolution that 
a massive and heavy-handed combat response will be perceived as decisive.181 
179. See supra text accompanying notes 279-95. 
181. Blank & Corn, supra note 20, at 738. 
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They suggest that in many parts of the world human rights law often is less 
likely to be effective than IHL in holding state actors to account, such as by inter-
national criminal prosecution.182  Applied to the temporary engagement context, 
this would suggest that recognizing a limited duration armed conflict could serve 
to inhibit the state from using excessive levels of force against opposition groups 
in a particular engagement. 
Blank and Corn acknowledge that an important concern about an expansive 
application of Common Article 3 is that recognizing a NIAC triggers not only 
protections but permissions with respect to the use of force.183  In particular, there 
is the risk of authorizing “the premature and unjustified use of [IHL] powers by a 
state to address an internal crisis.”184  
184. Blank & Corn, supra note 20, at 713; see also Deborah Pearlstein, The NIAC Threshold, OPINIO 
JURIS (Apr. 10, 2016), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/10/04/the-niac-threshold/; Jonathan Horowitz, Laws 
of War: Humanitarian Stallion or Trojan Horse?, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www. 
justsecurity.org/34128/laws-war-humanitarian-stallion-trojan-horse/; Jonathan Horowitz, Letter to the 
Editor: Response to Human Rights in Armed Conflict, Part I, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 23, 2016), https:// 
www.justsecurity.org/34846/letter-editor-response-human-rights-armed-conflict-part/. 
They suggest, however, that the temptation 
for states to “unleash the full force and effect of their military capabilities to 
respond to nascent internal opposition threats” exists regardless of whether hostil-
ities are characterized as a NIAC.  The greater risk therefore is leaving persons 
unprotected from such levels of force.  While we may aspire to a world in which 
human rights law provides background protections for persons across the world, 
the reality is that significant gaps exist. 
It could be true that triggering IHL will provide protection that otherwise 
would be unavailable, although, as Deborah Pearlstein has pointed out, it is not 
clear why a state uninterested in complying with human rights law would be any 
more concerned about complying with IHL.185  In any event, the scenario that 
Blank and Corn have in mind, such as Assad’s Syria, is not the type of setting 
with which Watkin is concerned.  His examples involve democratic states that 
are responding to violence in situations in which there is more reason to believe 
that human rights law as expressed in law enforcement standards can provide 
meaningful but flexible constraints on the use of force.  There is also more reason 
to believe that in these situations states will be sensitive to which body of law is 
deemed to apply to their use of force. 
If recognizing an armed conflict is not necessary in such cases to provide 
adequate protection against the abusive use of force, we should think carefully 
about whether we want to grant the expansive permissions to use force that IHL 
provides. This suggests that perhaps one consideration in determining if hostil-
ities constitute an armed conflict, including engagements of limited duration, 
should be whether such a designation is likely to be the only reasonable vehicle 
for providing protection against brutal uses of force. This would be consistent 
with Common Article 3’s desire to provide expansive protection, but would 
182. Blank & Corn, supra note 20, at 699-700 
183. Blank & Corn, supra note 20, at 712. 
185. Pearlstein, supra note 7. 
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acknowledge that at least in some parts of the world human rights law provides 
protections that obviate the need to trigger IHL. 
This leaves Watkin’s second concern about a demanding test for a NIAC, 
which is that accommodating the use of force within a law enforcement frame-
work might dilute the integrity of human rights law.  That is a more complex 
question that I will address in the next section.  That section will examine Monica 
Hakimi’s suggestion that, in light of the hybrid nature of many current security 
threats, judgments about targeting and detention for the most part should not 
focus on whether activity falls into the category of law enforcement or armed 
conflict. Instead it should be based on case-by-case contextual analysis. 
IV. CATEGORY AND CONTINUUM IN THE USE OF FORCE 
A. Use of Force and the “Domain Method” 
As I have described, Watkin argues for an approach based on the view that 
“contemporary warfare can be most effectively regulated by a more integrated 
application of all the various bodies of law that impact on armed conflict.”186 
While theorists tend to treat these bodies of law as distinct and exclusive, the real-
ity on the operational level is more fluid and dynamic.  It requires responding to a 
wide range of gradually differentiated threats, rather than to situations that clearly 
fall within one of two conceptual categories. 
If this is the case, should it lead us to rethink the value of assessing the use of 
force in terms of a binary framework?  Does it make sense for an incremental 
shift in the nature of a violent threat to lead to radically different authority to use 
force?  Is this an artifact of an historical period whose underlying assumptions no 
longer hold?  If our binary framework provides a template that does not readily 
map on to a far more complex practical reality, should we abandon it in favor of a 
more flexible analytical approach?  These questions raise fundamental issues 
about state power to use force that I discuss in this section.  I will suggest that 
human rights law and IHL share certain commitments that may allow them to be 
harmoniously aligned in some, perhaps many, instances.  With respect to taking 
life, however, they represent basic yet incommensurable ways of looking at state 
authority and responsibility that ultimately cannot be fully reconciled within a 
single analytical framework. 
One way to think about Watkin’s observations on the current operational real-
ity of violent threats and the use of force in response to them is that they lie on a 
continuum.  The Oxford English Dictionary defines a continuum as “a continuous 
sequence in which adjacent elements are not perceptibly different from each 
other, but the extremes are quite distinct.”187  
187. Continuum, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2018), https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
continuum. 
John Lane Bell says that “to be con-
tinuous is to constitute an unbroken or uninterrupted whole, like the ocean or the  
186. WATKIN, supra note 16, at 15. 
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sky. A continuous entity – a continuum – has no ‘gaps.’”188  
188. John L. Bell, Continuity and Infinitesimals, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Sept 6, 
2013), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/continuity/#1. 
Bell notes, “Opposed 
to continuity is discreteness: to be discrete is to be separated, like the scattered 
pebbles on a beach or the leaves on a tree. Continuity connotes unity; discrete-
ness, plurality.”189 
Experience by its nature is continuous, so it seems wrong to suggest that vio-
lent threats once were discrete but now are continuous.  A better way to think 
about Watkin’s point is that violence previously seemed more readily conceptual-
ized in terms of categories that were more discrete and distinctive than is now the 
case.  Categories are a way of organizing our understanding of experience in 
terms of clusters that have what we might call, borrowing Wittgenstein’s term, 
“family resemblances.”190  Together, they constitute “a possibly exhaustive set of 
classes among which all things might be distributed.”191 
191. Category, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2018), https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
category. 
Thus, we might express Watkin’s point by saying that the categories of law 
enforcement and armed conflict seemed at one point to encompass family resem-
blances in the use of force that clustered around two paradigmatic scenarios. 
Together, these two scenarios were seen as, if not completely exhaustive, none-
theless as organizing our understanding of state use of force in a way that 
adequately captured most of experience.  Now, however, instances of violence 
and the demands of responding to them are more diffuse; their features are less 
tightly clustered around the two paradigms.  This means that the categories that 
reflect those paradigms seem to do a less effective job in capturing the full range 
of experience across the continuum.  This in turn means that they are less useful 
to commanders on the ground who must determine how to respond to violent 
threats that do not readily fit into the binary legal categories that are available. 
One way to respond to this challenge is to attempt to develop new categories 
that more accurately capture operational experience.  This may result in a larger 
number of categories, or perhaps categories formulated along new lines that 
reflect different dimensions of experience.192  Another way is to eschew reliance 
on existing categories in favor of a case-by-case analysis that ostensibly focuses 
on the common underlying goals and concerns that relate to state use of force. 
Monica Hakimi has made a powerful argument in support of the second alter-
native with respect to targeting and detention.  I will focus here on her analysis of 
targeting.193  Hakimi maintains that current debate over targeting and detention is  
189. Id. 
190. See generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (Blackwell Publishing, 
4th ed. 2009). 
192. See BROOKS, supra note 9 at 353-362. 
193. I will also not discuss Hakimi’s discussion of emergencies, but will focus on her analysis of law 
enforcement and armed conflict as the two basic frameworks that are used to govern the situations that 
she discusses. 
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structured according to what she calls the “domain method.”194  That method 
requires that decision-makers justify their choices by classifying situations in 
terms of one of four domains: (1) law enforcement, (2) emergency, (3) armed 
conflict for civilians, and (4) armed conflict for combatants.  Hakimi describes 
the decision-making process that this approach prescribes: 
First, decisionmakers must identify the correct domain before assessing state 
conduct. Second, decisionmakers should fill regulatory gaps by expanding an 
existing domain’s scope of application. Third, extending a domain means 
requiring in the new context the outcome that was designed for its original 
context. Fourth, to the extent a domain is underdeveloped, its outcomes must 
be derived internally. No overarching framework exists for developing the law 
within domains.195 
One problem with this approach is that “[m]any modern situations do not fit 
comfortably in any domain, leading to intractable disputes about which one gov-
erns.”196  A second problem occurs when decision-makers who attempt to 
respond to this challenge by suggesting hybrid standards are unable to justify 
them in terms of the domain method.  It may seem to make sense, for instance, to 
develop an operational approach that is more permissive than one domain but 
less permissive than another.  The prevailing emphasis on classification into dis-
crete domains, however, discredits such approaches “in favor of the available but 
contested extremes.”197 
The result is that decision-makers must justify their proposals “by invoking 
legal categories that are often inapposite to the facts.”  Thus, for instance, 
“instead of assessing the bin Laden operation on the merits, analysts debated 
which domain governed. Those who disagree on the domain talk past one 
another, applying different standards to assess the same or similar conduct.”  The 
rules for using force would be very different if the mission were characterized as 
a law enforcement operation or a military operation during armed conflict.198 
Hakimi argues that this focus on classification prevents a substantive debate on 
the underlying concerns that are implicated in various scenarios, which could 
lead to agreement on how to address at least some situations that don’t seem to fit 
squarely into any single domain.  She suggests that this is a particular concern 
with respect to issues in international law, because that field of law functions and 
evolves discursively through the presentation of argument and counterargument 
rather than through authoritative pronouncements by an international sovereign. 
194. See Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1366. 
195. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1373. 
196. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1366-67. 
197. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1367. 
198. It also could be characterized as a discrete act of state self-defense subject to the jus ad bellum, 
but the requirements under that regime are not as strikingly different from the law enforcement 
paradigm as those under an armed conflict model. 
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The domain method and the specific domains that it recognizes, Hakimi says, 
are products of a particular historical period.  IHL reflects the predominance of 
conflicts between states in the period from the mid-nineteenth century through 
World War II.  Its rules on targeting and detention are based on a paradigm of 
hostilities in which uniformed state forces distinguish themselves from civilians. 
The human rights law that has become more prominent since World War II 
focuses on “everyday relations between a government and its people. By default, 
its norms have been crafted for domestic law enforcement settings,” with some 
limited exceptions for emergencies. “The predicament,” Hakimi says, “is that, 
because of its splintered origins, the international law on targeting and detention 
specifies outcomes for only some contexts. Modern sensibilities demand that it 
regulate all contexts.” 
Hakimi argues we should abandon the domain method in favor of what she 
describes as a “functional” approach to targeting and detention.  That approach 
focuses on the core concerns that cut across all four current domains.  These con-
cerns are reflected in three principles.  The first is the liberty-security principle. 
This requires that “[t]he security benefits of targeting or detaining someone must 
be proportional to or outweigh the costs to individual liberty.”199  Thus, “[t]he 
greater the threat and the less intrusive the deprivation of liberty, the more expan-
sive the state’s coercive authority.”200 
In general, Hakimi says, “targeting satisfies the liberty–security principle if the 
person poses an active, serious threat to bodily integrity. In that event, the benefit 
of a targeting operation (protecting life or limb) is proportional to its cost (taking 
life).”201  Combatants in armed conflict, she says, are presumed to pose an active 
deadly threat.202  In law enforcement settings, human rights law “prohibits tar-
geted killings that are disproportionate to their intended ends. A targeted killing 
is disproportionate unless the target poses a threat of death or serious bodily 
injury.”203 
The second basic principle is the mitigation principle.  This requires that even 
faced with a serious threat, “a state must use reasonable nonlethal measures to 
contain it.”204  Hakimi notes that “[m]easures that are reasonable in law enforce-
ment settings—where states exercise considerable control—are almost always 
too burdensome during active combat.”205  Combatants are entitled to use lethal 
force against one another in armed conflict as a first resort because IHL presumes 
that they have no reasonably available alternative to eliminate the threat that each 
presumptively poses to the other.206  Furthermore, even a combatant who appears 
199. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1385. 
200. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1386. 
201. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1386. 
202. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1391. 
203. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1392. 
204. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1392. 
205. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1392-93. 
206. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1395. 
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alone and unarmed might be involved in a ruse, or his compatriots might be just 
around the corner.”207  As a result, Hakimi observes, “[t]he combatant domain 
declines to muddy its otherwise rule-like prescription—targetable unless hors de 
combat—for the exceptional case in which an officer knows that he can capture a 
combatant without putting himself at serious risk or undermining his mission.”208 
The final fundamental principle with regard to targeting and detention, Hakimi 
says, is the mistake principle.  This requires that a state verify that: 
(1) the specific person being targeted or detained (2) poses a sufficiently seri-
ous threat (3) that cannot reasonably be contained less intrusively. In other 
words, states must exercise due diligence to avoid mistakes and establish a rea-
sonable and honest belief that their conduct is lawful. That diligence is gener-
ally less when a state acts in the heat of the moment than when it acts with 
time for deliberation.209 
IHL assumes that there is little likelihood of mistake once someone has been 
positively identified as a combatant.  When the situation is ambiguous, a state 
must presume that someone is a civilian and “may target him only after establish-
ing an honest and reasonable belief that he is targetable.”210  It must make more 
of an effort to establish this conclusion the more time that it has available before 
it must act.  Similarly, in the law enforcement context, “the state must do more 
when acting with time for deliberation than when responding to events as they 
unfold.”211 
Hakimi maintains that these are the principles that underlie the law of targeting 
and detention under both human rights law and IHL: “The same core principles 
animate targeting and detention law in all domains.”212  Decisions about targeting 
and detention in specific situations should be based on the application of these 
principles to the circumstances at hand, she argues, rather than on classification 
of the situation into one of the four domains that she describes. 
This conception of the rules governing the use of force is that they rest on three 
fundamental principles, which we apply to situations that can be arrayed on a 
continuum.  Moving from restrictive to permissive authority to use force, these 
situations reflect threats that gradually increase in gravity, circumstances that 
incrementally make it less feasible for the state to respond non-forcibly to these 
threats, and conditions that gradually make it more difficult for the state to deter-
mine if a particular individual poses an actual threat.  The domains of law 
enforcement/human rights and armed conflict thus simply reflect segments of the 
continuum that encompass particular combinations of these contextual features. 
207. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1395. 
208. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1395. 
209. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1387. 
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It is the contextual analysis of these features, however, not the classification of a 
situation as falling within a particular domain, that does the analytical work. 
Thus in all situations “[t]argeting is lawful if (1) the person poses a threat of 
deadly force, (2) the state pursues reasonable alternatives for containing that 
threat, and (3) the state exercises due diligence to prevent mistakes.”213 With 
respect to detention in all cases, those detained “must actually pose a threat;”214 
as detention increases, “the benefits of containing the threat must be more sub-
stantial to remain proportional;”215 states “presumptively should prosecute and 
punish people, rather than detain them without trial;”216 and states should provide 
procedures to ensure accurate decisions, whose features may vary based on what 
is reasonably feasible under the circumstances.217  While Hakimi does not explic-
itly suggest that we should abandon altogether the categories of law enforcement 
and armed conflict, the logic of her position is that we could do so because they 
obscure the substantive analytical judgments that are most significant. 
Hakimi surely is right that debates over the use of force often devolve into for-
malistic disputes over classification that ignore the complex features of particular 
security threats and the responses that are appropriate to them.  There are many 
instances in which classification of hostilities in either category seems unsatisfy-
ing and Procrustean.  Hakimi’s plea to focus instead on the values that are impli-
cated in specific contexts points us in the right direction, and her articulation of 
those values provides helpful guidance for engaging in that type of analysis. 
The basic spirit of Hakimi’s model is consistent with Rosa Brooks’s suggestion 
that we need to recognize that “war and peace are not binary opposites, but lie 
along a continuum.”218 Much as we may long for a world in which peace is the 
norm and war the exception, says Brooks, “some degree of war has been the 
norm for much of human history, and pure ‘peace’ has been the exception.”219 
She argues that the nature of modern security threats are such that we no longer 
have any principled way to make this distinction, and thus are left with legal cate-
gories that cannot do the work that we ask of them.  We therefore need to develop 
new frameworks for analyzing situations that fall in the gray area between war 
and peace. 
Thus, for instance, Brooks suggests, rather than trying to determine if targeted 
killing is governed by law enforcement or armed conflict standards, we should 
acknowledge that it implicates concerns from each category.  Targets of such 
operations aim to inflict harm on a much larger scale than conventional criminals, 
and often are located in areas beyond effective control by law enforcement opera-
tions.  At the same time, operations against some targets do not represent simply 
213. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1397-98. 
214. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1407. 
215. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1409. 
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the use of force on a battlefield, where there is little time for individualized deter-
minations of liability to deadly force.  Instead, they are the result of an extensive 
process in which individuals are nominated and selected for inclusion on a target-
ing list.220  Perhaps, then, we could devise mechanisms that would provide greater 
transparency and accountability for such operations, while recognizing that these 
will not strictly conform to traditional criminal procedural requirements.221 
Brooks’s book engages thoughtfully with a wider range of issues than are beyond 
my focus here, and she does not frame her approach in terms of Hakimi’s princi-
ples.  Nonetheless, her argument that we should eschew reliance on formal cate-
gories in favor of hybrid contextual analysis along a continuum reflects the same 
skepticism about the value of distinguishing between law enforcement and armed 
conflict settings as a guide to action. 
B. Assessing the Assumption of Continuity 
While modern security threats may require analytical flexibility, it is not clear 
that we should simply engage in contextual analysis of the use of force without 
any reference to the categories of law enforcement and armed conflict.  Watkin, 
for instance, does suggest that we should not treat human rights law and IHL as 
completely different categories that are mutually exclusive.  Instead, he argues, 
we need to recognize that human rights law should guide operations within IHL 
in some cases.222  While he does not discuss Hakimi’s model at length, he con-
cludes that “[t]here is considerable value in maintaining a separation between law 
enforcement and conduct of hostilities frameworks due to the exceptional levels 
of violence that can occur even in internal conflict.”223  It is worth considering at 
greater length why maintaining separate domains is desirable. 
A purely contextual approach reflects the assumption that there is a basic conti-
nuity of state interests across the continuum, and a common normative commit-
ment with regard to when the use of force is justified.  This implicitly treats 
human rights principles as the governing norms across the continuum.  We are to 
begin with the requirement of human rights law for individualized assessments of 
immediate threats, and then adjust our analysis as we gradually move away from 
the peaceful domestic setting in which such assessments are feasible.  On this 
view, IHL rules are rooted in the core human rights principle of intrinsic individ-
ual dignity and worth. They simply reflect pragmatic adaption of these principles 
based on the distinctive circumstances of armed conflict, rather than a fundamen-
tally different orientation toward taking life. 
220. See Presidential Policy Guidance, supra note 98; Gregory S. McNeal, Targeting Killing and 
Accountability, 102 GEO. L. J. 681 (2014). 
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Hakimi’s description of how the basic principles governing targeting apply 
across the continuum illustrates her reliance on this assumption.  Thus, she notes 
that law enforcement rules permit use of lethal force only against persons who 
pose an active serious threat of deadly force,224 and require that the state pursue 
reasonably feasible alternatives before it uses force against such persons.225  IHL, 
Hakimi says, accepts this principle but recognizes that it is not practicable during 
armed conflict to identify specific individuals who pose an active serious threat. 
It therefore conclusively presumes that all enemy combatants do so.226  Similarly, 
IHL assumes that states engaged in armed conflict do not exercise control over 
their surroundings, which makes it too burdensome to require consideration of 
non-forcible alternatives before using force against enemy combatants.227 
A continuum approach thus implicitly assumes that the underlying values that 
constrain state use of force are the same, but that the practicalities of armed con-
flict make bright-line presumptions necessary in certain cases.  What we think of 
as armed conflict governed by IHL is simply that portion of the continuum where 
ordinary background conditions of law enforcement do not exist, which requires 
a shift in many cases from individualized determinations to presumptions.  At its 
core, however, IHL is animated by the same aim as human rights law: to mini-
mize loss of life and to limit state use of violence to situations in which it is abso-
lutely necessary. 
Before examining this assumption more closely, it is useful to consider how it 
reflects a view of the relationship between human rights law and armed conflict 
that has become more prominent in recent years.  As I have noted, the prevailing 
view now is that IHL does not displace human rights law during armed conflict. 
Rather, the latter body of law applies at all times.  The task therefore is to harmo-
nize and give effect to the principles animating the two bodies of law when they 
simultaneously apply. 
As Naz Modirzadeh notes, many observers seem to regard this harmonization 
as involving progressively greater incorporation of human rights principles into 
IHL.228  This reflects “the notion that we are witnessing a now-inevitable trend of 
progress toward more human rights, that the question of convergence [between 
the two bodies of law] is no longer a question of ‘whether’ as much as ‘how 
far.’”229  Similarly, what Thomas Smith describes as “the marriage of human 
rights law and the law of war” has resulted in a state of affairs in which: 
[h]uman rights and war law speak in one voice with respect to genocide and 
crimes against humanity, torture, and terrorism. Landmines and chemical 
224. Hakimi, supra note 9, at 1391. 
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weapons have been banned, human rights courts masquerade as war crimes 
courts, and humanitarian rhetoric infuses the conduct of modern warfare. State 
reciprocity has begun to cede to global norms, legal rules are increasingly rec-
ognizable to human rights, and accountability has been strengthened.230 
It is not hard to imagine that one might move from this view to the assumption 
that the underlying principle of both bodies of law is protection of human rights. 
Thus, for instance, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
trial chamber has declared: “The essence of the whole corpus of international hu-
manitarian law as well as human rights law lies in the protection of the human 
dignity of every person.”231 Similarly, a United Nations report on International 
Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict declares, “International 
human rights law and international humanitarian law share the goal of preserving 
the dignity and humanity of all . . . [I]n armed conflict, parties to the conflict have 
legally binding obligations concerning the rights of persons affected by the con-
flict.”232  As Rene Provost observes, “There is an observable tendency in the liter-
ature inspired primarily by human rights law to consider humanitarian law as 
merely a subset of human rights.”233  From this perspective, harmonization of the 
two bodies of law should result in convergence around human rights principles 
that have always been implicit in IHL. 
It is certainly true that, as Watkin notes throughout his book, some provisions 
of IHL can be seen as at least implicitly expressing  human rights norms, in that 
they provide protections for persons who are not part of the armed conflict.234 
Indeed, Watkin’s book is especially notable as an acknowledgment by a promi-
nent military lawyer that human rights law and IHL share similar concerns with 
respect to many issues, that human rights law can provide guidance in some cases 
on how protections established in IHL can be given more detailed content. It 
emphasizes that there are situations within armed conflict in which armed forces 
should be guided by human rights and law enforcement standards. 
Provost, for instance, has noted that the prohibition of discrimination in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is reflected in Articles 12 of the first two 
Geneva Conventions, Article 16 of the Third, and Article 27 of the Fourth.235 
Article 16 of the Third provides, for instance, that “all prisoners of war shall be 
treated alike by the Detaining Power, without any adverse distinction based on 
race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions, or any other distinction 
230. Thomas W. Smith, Can Human Rights Build a Better War?, 9 J. HUM. RTS. 24, 24-25 (2010). 
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founded on similar criteria.”236  Similarly, Common Article 3 requires that all 
persons not taking an active part in hostilities be treated “humanely,” and are pro-
tected against discrimination; “violence to life and person”; “outrages upon per-
sonal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment”; and the 
imposition of sentences without a prior judgment by “a regularly constituted 
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable 
by civilized peoples.”237 
In addition, as Provost points out, Article 75 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I 
sets forth a host of “fundamental guarantees” for persons in the power of a party 
to the conflict that resemble Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.238  Human rights principles and jurisprudence can serve to elabo-
rate and specify the meaning of these protections in light of the fact that the two 
bodies of law are animated by similar concerns on these subjects. Such elabora-
tion and specification more explicitly incorporates a deontological perspective 
within an IHL framework that is broadly consequentialist.  To the extent this has 
occurred, there has indeed been some convergence between human rights law 
and IHL. 
Similarly, greater use of criminal tribunals to try alleged perpetrators of war 
crimes serves to highlight and vindicate the rights of individual victims during 
armed conflict.239  The idea that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and 
their Additional Protocols are universal criminal prohibitions represents a cate-
gorical exception to the priority that IHL accords to military necessity.  It 
expresses the idea that some conduct is simply wrong, not that it is wrong because 
the harm that results does not gain a military advantage or is excessive in relation 
to such an advantage.  Finally, greater acceptance of the idea that states may have 
human rights obligations during military operations outside of their territories 
reflects explicit incorporation of human rights concerns in some contexts within 
an armed conflict.240 
C. Deontological and Consequentialist Moral Lenses 
Notwithstanding these similarities, it is important to appreciate that IHL and 
human rights law have very different roots that reflect basic commitments that 
are in tension, if not explicitly opposed.  One way to conceptualize this is Jens 
Ohlin’s distinction between the state as sovereign and as belligerent.241  Human 
rights law focuses on the state as sovereign, and assumes a fundamental 
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asymmetry in power between the state and its citizens.  Its aim is to constrain the 
sovereign’s ability to exploit this asymmetry against the individuals over whom it 
exercises power.242 IHL focuses on the state in its role as belligerent acting on 
behalf of subjects, and seeks to regulate the exercise of force against other bellig-
erents who are regarded as legal equals.243 
The difference in these roles is most stark with respect to the authority to take 
life.  In the most basic terms, the approach of human rights law to this question is 
profoundly deontological, while IHL is predominantly consequentialist.  These 
differences are worth elaborating in some detail. 
The core principle of human rights law is the intrinsic value of each individual, 
as expressed in the pronouncement in the preamble to The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of free-
dom, justice and peace in the world.” 
In keeping with this core commitment, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights states that “[e]very human being has the inherent right to life”244; 
the American Convention on Human Rights provides that “[e]very person has the 
right to have his life respected”245; and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights says, “[h]uman beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be 
entitled to respect for his life.”246  The European Convention provides, “[e]ver-
yone’s right to life shall be protected by law.”247 The first three Conventions pro-
vide that no one may be “arbitrarily deprived” of life, and permit no derogation 
from the obligation to respect the right to life.  Article 2 of the European 
Convention specifies the situations in which deprivation of life is not considered 
a violation of the right when force is used that is no more than “absolutely neces-
sary.”  It permits derogation from Article 2 for deaths that result from “lawful 
acts of war.”248  These provisions reflect a strong commitment to protection of 
life based on deontological grounds. 
Respect for the intrinsic value of life, and the sovereign’s responsibility to pro-
tect it, provides that the use of force by the state in the law enforcement setting is 
permissible only to protect individuals from the violent threats that they pose to 
one another.  This expresses the idea that the life of each individual has intrinsic 
worth.  A person’s life may not be taken simply to benefit another person or group 
242. Id. at 126; see also Meron, supra note 1, at 240 (“Human rights laws protect physical integrity 
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of persons, but only if she fails to respect the life of another by threatening his life 
without moral justification.  Human rights law thus authorizes force in order to 
protect individual lives, in situations in which individuals become liable to loss of 
life by virtue of being morally responsible for posing a grave unjust threat to 
others. 
The paradigmatic case in which police use of force is authorized is to protect 
someone “against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, [or] to prevent 
the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life.”249 
As I have indicated, the imminence requirement is relaxed when it is necessary to 
effect the arrest of someone who poses such a grave threat, or to prevent him 
from escaping.  The rationale for using force in that case is to protect the public 
from having such a dangerous person at large.  The threat that the individual 
poses in that case is a matter more of probability than certainty.  In this sense, the 
justification arguably has something of a consequentialist flavor, in that the goal 
of protecting the public is regarded as authorizing the use of force against some-
one who may not in fact commit future violent acts.  This reflects the fact that, as 
I discuss in more detail below, movement from the aim of protecting individuals 
to that of protecting a broader collective begins to bring consequentialist consid-
erations into play. 
There is still a strong deontological element to the justification, however, in 
that the individual is responsible for engaging in prior behavior that makes it rea-
sonable to regard him as a threat.   As Jeff McMahan has suggested, “a person 
can make himself liable to be killed if he acts in a way that increases the objective 
probability that he will wrongly kill an innocent person.”250 McMahan acknowl-
edges that at the time lethal force is used it may not be absolutely certain that the 
potential murderer will carry out his plans if he is not killed.  Nonetheless, “unless 
the objective probability that he will kill his intended victim is so low that killing 
him defensively would be disproportionate, it would be unjust for his wholly 
innocent potential victim to have to bear a risk of being murdered by him in order 
that he should be spared.”251  McMahan has in mind an individual who is plotting 
against another individual, which is a situation in which there may be especially 
good reason to believe that he poses a future threat.  Nonetheless, if there is 
enough evidence to meet the law enforcement standard for the use of force 
against a person resisting arrest or fleeing, the basic principle applies. 
The law enforcement requirements of necessity and proportionality also have 
strong deontological grounding.  With respect to necessity, the UN Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials 
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provide that “intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly 
unavoidable in order to protect life.”252  They express the principle of proportion-
ality by stating that force may be used “only when less extreme means are insuffi-
cient to achieve” the objectives for which force is authorized.253  These principles 
are served by the requirement that law enforcement officials “shall identify them-
selves as such and give a clear warning of their intent to use firearms, with suffi-
cient time for the warning to be observed,” unless this poses an unreasonable 
risk.254 
The state as sovereign therefore is limited to using force in pursuit of the goal 
of protecting the lives of individuals within the state from violent threats by other 
individuals.  Use of force for this purpose is constrained by human rights stand-
ards that are generally in accordance with deontological principles.  The state is 
authorized to use force to accomplish its goal only when absolutely necessary, 
and the force that it may use even in that instance must be as minimal as possible. 
As William Boothby summarizes human rights requirements that apply to the 
state in this role: 
When responses to anticipated security situations are being undertaken, care 
will be required and all viable non-lethal options should be pursued. Only if 
the use of lethal force is the only viable way of addressing the situation should 
it be adopted. . . Once it is determined that lethal force is indeed the only viable 
option, i.e. that it is absolutely necessary, the amount of force used, the time 
period during which it is used and the locations where it is used must also be 
reduced to that which is absolutely necessary and objectively proportionate to 
the circumstances.255 
By contrast, in its role as belligerent under IHL, the purpose for which the state 
may use force is to act to defend itself against a threat posed by another collec-
tive.  The state thus is engaged in state self-defense, not defense of individuals as 
in the law enforcement setting.  Accomplishing this goal means defeating the 
enemy.  Defeating the enemy may require the use of a substantial amount of 
force.  IHL limits the use of that force by permitting it only in furtherance of mili-
tary necessity, tempered by considerations of humanity and proportionality. 
Members of enemy forces may be killed in furtherance of military necessity, 
regardless of whether any of them are morally responsible for posing a threat at 
the time they die.  Innocent persons also may be killed in pursuit of that aim if the 
number of their deaths is not excessive. 
The central place of the concept of military necessity in armed conflict 
embodies, as the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual says, “the 
252. U.N. Basic Principles, supra note 61, ¶ 9. 
253. U.N. Basic Principles, supra note 61, ¶ 9. 
254. U.N. Basic Principles, supra note 61, ¶ 10. 
255. See W.H. BOOTHBY, CONFLICT LAW: THE INFLUENCE OF NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND EMERGING ACTORS 317-64. 
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principle that justifies the use of all measures needed to defeat the enemy as 
quickly and efficiently as possible that are not prohibited by the law of war.”256 
This reflects the view that Francis Lieber expressed in Article 29 of the Code that 
he devised for the Union Army during the American Civil War: “The more vigo-
rously wars are pursued, the better it is for humanity.  Sharp wars are brief.”257 
Similarly, the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration states in its preamble that the only 
aim that states may seek to achieve during war is “to weaken the military forces 
of the enemy,” and “for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible 
number of men.”258 
258. The Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, http://e-brief. 
icrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/7-st-petersburg-declaration.pdf. 
Thus, unlike the concept of necessity under law enforcement standards, the 
IHL principle of necessity is not animated principally by the aim of limiting use 
of force to situations in which it is unavoidable.  IHL assumes that force will be 
used, and attempts to limit its use to deployment against targets whose destruction 
will result in a military advantage in the conflict.  Jens Ohlin and Larry May elab-
orate on this point in their analysis of the concept of military necessity pro-
pounded by Lieber.259  Notwithstanding changes in international law since then, 
they argue, “it is clear that the principle of necessity has largely remained 
unchanged since Lieber.”260 
Ohlin and May suggest that, for Lieber, necessity served as a license to use 
force, not as a constraint on it.  His Code makes clear that “what is outlawed by 
the principle of necessity is death and destruction not related to the war effort.”261 
Thus, the Code says, “Military necessity does not admit of cruelty – that is, the 
infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge.”262 Any use of force 
that contributes to ending the conflict by defeating the enemy is permissible, and 
is in fact salutary on humanitarian grounds, because it helps hasten the end of the 
suffering that war inevitably entails. Ohlin and May emphasize that appreciating 
this philosophy clarifies that this conception of necessity is not equivalent to 
requiring that an action is indispensable to achieve a military aim, as Grotius sug-
gested in the seventeenth century, and as current proponents of the least restric-
tive means test argue today.  This conception of necessity as constraint 
characterizes human rights law, but it is the conception of necessity as license 
that distinguishes IHL: 
Necessity permits killing and destruction of enemy forces, whereas the specific 
prohibitions (distinction, proportionality, restrictions on various weapons, the 
prohibition on unnecessary suffering, perfidy, etc.) restrict the use of force. 
256. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 4, §2.2. 
257. Francis Lieber, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN 
THE FIELD, (Washington, Government Printing Office 1898) [Hereinafter “Lieber Code”]. 
259. JENS DAVID OHLIN & LARRY MAY, NECESSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-106 (2016). 
260. Id. at 109. 
261. Id. at 96. 
262. Lieber Code, supra note 257, art. 16. 
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But it is important not to confuse the two, and one certainly cannot use the spe-
cific prohibitions as a rationale for reading the general principle of necessity in 
a wider fashion.263 
Similarly, the IHL principle of proportionality is not meant, as in the law 
enforcement setting, to ensure that the least amount of force is used to achieve 
the state’s goal. Instead, it authorizes whatever force is necessary for an attack to 
succeed against a military target, as long as there is not an excessive amount of ci-
vilian harm compared to the military advantage.  As David Luban notes, “individ-
ual civilians can lose protection against attack merely because they have the bad 
luck to be near an important target and surrounded by too few other civilians. 
Their human rights play no role in the proportionality assessment [.]”  Rather, 
that assessment “aggregates damage to civilian persons [.]”264 
IHL, in other words, does not attempt to prevent violence or loss of life. 
Rather, it accepts that it will occur, often on a massive scale. IHL attempts simply 
to ensure that the harm that results from these efforts does not significantly 
exceed the harm necessary to win the war.  As David Kennedy puts it, IHL 
demands “no unnecessary damage, not one more civilian than necessary.”265 
This consequentialist approach to state use of force is in sharp contrast to the 
deontological foundations of human rights law. 
David Luban underscores this character of IHL by describing it as “bentha-
mite” in nature.266  That is, it reflects a commitment to maximizing pleasure and 
minimizing pain.  In particular it embodies a “negative” version of benthamism 
in that its primary aim is the latter.267  The focus is on the aggregate net amount of 
pleasure and pain, or benefits and costs, not on the particular individuals whose 
experiences contribute to this sum.  The benefits represent the outcomes from 
operations based on military necessity; the costs represent the suffering that is 
incurred in pursuit of that end.  Luban suggests that even the IHL principle of dis-
tinction can be seen as based on consequentialist concerns.  “If disabling combat-
ants suffices to win wars,” he observes, “targeting civilians is unnecessary, and so 
it is not” a permissible object for states.268  This reasoning, “grounding IHL in the 
benthamite concern to alleviate the calamities of war rather than respect for 
human dignity, seems the more plausible origin of the principle of distinction.”269 
Indeed, intentionally targeting innocent civilians can be seen as a violation of the 
principle of military necessity. 
263. OHLIN & MAY, supra note 259, at 99. 
264. Luban, supra note 239, at 51. 
265. David Kennedy, Reassessing International Humanitarianism: The Dark Sides, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 131, 139 (Anne Orford ed., 2006). 
266. Luban, supra note 239, at 50. Luban uses the lower case to refer to a basic utilitarian or 
consequentialist approach to differentiate the concept from Jeremy Bentham’s specific version of this. 
267. Luban, supra note 239, at 50. 
268. Luban, supra note 239, at 52. 
269. Luban, supra note 239, at 52. 
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The state goal of protecting its population therefore ostensibly is pursued most 
humanely by using whatever force will most quickly defeat the enemy within the 
bounds of the law of war.  Soldiers will die, and innocent civilians almost cer-
tainly will die, not because they are morally liable to the use of force, but because 
their deaths are intended to serve the larger good of ending the war as quickly as 
possible. An attack on a military target is permissible as long as the expectation is 
that it will produce some military advantage.  Moral responsibility, the corner-
stone of law enforcement standards for liability to force, plays no role in these 
calculations.  Instead, the use of force is regulated according to consequentialist 
considerations that focus on the aggregate, not the individual level.  IHL is meant 
to temper this awful reality, not to apply deontological human rights principles to 
armed conflict.  As David Luban has noted, the original motivation of IHL “is 
more like disaster relief than the vindication of rights.”270 
A final point about IHL is its emphasis on providing clear rules that can be 
readily applied by the average combatant during the chaos, ambiguity and vio-
lence that mark armed conflict.  Anyone who is a combatant can be targeted at 
any time, and can be detained for the duration of the hostilities.  Anyone who 
meets certain criteria must be treated as a prisoner of war.  Any civilian who 
directly participates in hostilities may be attacked while they are doing so, but not 
afterward.  Any civilian who is not participating in hostilities may not be 
attacked. 
Asymmetric conflict creates challenges in applying these categories, and sol-
diers in fact may need to exercise considerable discretion.  The aim of IHL, how-
ever, is to reduce as much as possible the need for intricate contextual 
deliberations about the use of force.  Law enforcement settings also can place dif-
ficult demands on officers, but human rights law assumes that these representa-
tives of the state are in a position to make more fine-grained particularistic 
assessments than IHL assumes combatants are in a position to make.  Unlike 
under human rights law, state obligations under IHL apply to individuals not qua 
individuals, but as members of specific categories of persons. 
In sum, “[f]or humanitarian law, the use of force is an integral part of the law, 
while killing is antithetical to the very idea of human rights.”271  As Ohlin and 
May put it, military necessity “is that aspect of the law of armed conflict that 
changes the default rule . . . that killing is impermissible.”272  IHL is, as two other 
authors describe it, a set of rules “written by the utilitarians for the warriors.”273 
For these reasons, a comparison of IHL with human rights law must recognize 
that “the issue of differing origins, differing foundational philosophies, and 
differing imagined communities of the law is not simply a historical artifact to 
be overcome by progress; it reflects the wisdom of not pretending that armed 
270. Luban, supra note 239, at 55. 
271. OBERLEITNER, supra note 5, at 131. 
272. OHLIN & MAY, supra note 259, at 105. 
273. Eric S. Krause & Mike O. Lacey, Utilitarian vs. Humanitarian: The Battle Over the Law of 
War, 32 PARAMETERS 73, 73 (2002). 
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conflict is anything other than what it is: unpredictable, often cruel, bloody and 
unjust.”274 
C. Protecting Lives and Protecting States 
The sharply divergent deontological and consequentialist perspectives on tak-
ing life reflected in human rights law and IHL therefore are not simply contingent 
historical features that could be reconciled by simply reformulating IHL in deon-
tological terms.  Rather, they reflect differences that are rooted in the distinctive 
moral demands that apply to the state’s protection of its subjects from violence 
against one another on the one hand – the state as sovereign, in Ohlin’s terms – 
and the state’s actions to protect itself in the name of those subjects in armed con-
flict on the other – the state as belligerent. 
With respect to the state’s role in protecting its subjects, the asymmetry 
between the sovereign and those subject to its power, and the potential for abuse 
of that power, mandates that the state use force to protect its subjects in a way 
that embodies respect for the intrinsic value of each individual life.  This requires 
individualized assessments of moral responsibility of individuals for posing grave 
unjust threats to others before the state may take a life.  This deontological imper-
ative is reflected in the requirement that force be used as a last resort, and that no 
more force than necessary be used against someone who poses an unjust threat. 
The paradigmatic instance of justified deadly force based on deontological princi-
ples is when one individual poses an imminent threat to the life of another.  In 
this case, the moral responsibility and liability to deadly force are clear, as is the 
state’s authority to use force to protect the life of one of its subjects. 
As I have suggested, the deontological imperative in the law enforcement set-
ting remains as we move toward protection of collective interests rather than par-
ticular individuals, but it arguably is qualified to some degree by consequentialist 
considerations.  A fleeing person may be killed not because he poses an imminent 
grave threat to a particular individual, but because he poses such a threat to the 
public at large.  This authority to use deadly force is based to some extent on con-
sequentialism, in that it is not certain that the individual will ever pose a threat to 
anyone in the future.  The risk that he may do so, however, is deemed sufficient to 
take his life, on the view that on balance this best protects the larger population 
from harm in the future. 
There is still a strong deontological grounding for the authority to use force in 
this situation in that, as Jeff McMahan has suggested, the individual in question is 
morally responsible for the reasonable belief that he poses a future threat.  The 
important point nonetheless is that the state’s desire to protect the public at large 
does allow for at least some deviation from strict deontological demands.  Such 
deviation seems inevitable when the state is attempting to protect the collective 
from future harms, given the difficulty, if not impossibility, of making precise 
274. Modirzadeh, supra note 228, at 367. 
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judgments about the threat that particular individuals pose to specific other indi-
viduals who make up the collective in this situation. 
Similarly, the need to quell a riot or civil disturbance that threatens the public 
order may provide some latitude to depart from the requirement to identify pre-
cisely the threat that specific individuals pose to other particular individuals.275 
In this way, consequentialist considerations may have at least some influence. 
Nonetheless, deontological principles still impose stringent constraints.  Police 
may not, for instance, simply fire into a crowd that contains some people with 
weapons, or use force likely to kill or cause serious injury if the crowd does not 
pose a threat of these types of harm. 
The paradigmatic case in which the state attempts to protect a collective inter-
est is when it engages in armed conflict in its own defense.  The threat in this case 
is not simply to the individuals who comprise the population of the state.  Instead, 
it is deemed to be to the state’s very ability to meet its basic obligation to protect 
its subjects.  Given the fundamentally collective nature of the interest under 
threat, it is very difficult to imagine constraining the use of force according to 
deontological principles.  As Janina Dill has carefully elaborated, it is simply 
impossible for war to be waged according to the rights-respecting principle that 
liability to force must be based on individualized assessment of moral responsi-
bility for posing an unjust threat of harm.276 
It is thus no surprise that IHL rules with respect to taking life are grounded in 
consequentialist principles.  These principles apply to the state as belligerent in a 
conflict with another belligerent that is regarded as its legal equal.  Each belliger-
ent acts on behalf of a collective.  It is authorized to protect that collective by tak-
ing the lives of individuals based on whether they fall into categories that are 
deemed likely to include persons who pose a threat to the collective. This is mo-
rality on the aggregate, not the individual, level.  As Dill observes, “There is noth-
ing more obviously at odds with the deontological premise of individual rights 
than killing human beings as a means to a military end.”277 
The German Federal Constitutional Court decision in Dr. H. et al. v. s.14.3 of 
the Aviation Security Act of 11 January 2005 underscores the sharp discontinuity 
in the bases for using force in the law enforcement and armed conflict settings.278 
278. BVERFG, 1 BVR 357/05, Feb 15, 2006, http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20060215_1bvr035705en. 
html. 
In that case, the Court reviewed a challenge to German legislation that addressed 
275. ECHR, supra note 60, art. 2(2)(c). 
276. Janina Dill, Should International Law Ensure the Moral Acceptability of War?, 26 LEIDEN J. 
INT’L L. 253, 263 (2013) [hereinafter Moral Acceptability of War] (War cannot conform to the moral 
requirement of respecting individual rights because it is an “epistemically cloaked forced choice” 
situation in which actors will unavoidably commit a moral wrong either by acting or not acting, and “[a] 
well-informed, impartial observer cannot determine with reasonable certainty, which course of action 
will in the end represent the lesser evil.”); see also Janina Dill & Henry Shue, Limiting the Killing in 
War: Military Necessity and the St. Petersburg Assumption, 26 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 311, 313 (2012) 
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224 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 10:171 
the situation in which one or more persons have taken command of an aircraft 
with the apparent intention of using it as a weapon by crashing it into a building 
or other populated area.  In such a situation, the law authorized the armed forces 
to assist the police in attempting to avert the threat posed by the aircraft.  This as-
sistance was to take the form of attempting first to warn and divert the craft by 
attempting to force it off its course or force it to land, threatening to use armed 
force, or firing warning shots. 
If these efforts were unsuccessful, the law authorized the use of armed force 
against the aircraft.  As the Court described, this was permissible “only if the 
occurrence of an especially grave accident cannot be prevented” by other meas-
ures.279 “This, however, only applies where it must be assumed under the circum-
stances that the aircraft is intended to be used as a weapon against human lives, 
and where the direct use of armed force is the only means to avert this imminent 
danger.”280  Authorization for such action was lodged exclusively with the 
Federal Minister of Defense. 
A challenge was brought to the law by persons who frequently use planes for 
private and professional reasons on the ground that it violated their fundamental 
rights to human dignity and to life under the German Basic Law. Article 1.1 of 
that law provides: “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it 
shall be the duty of all state authority.”281  
281. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 1 § 1, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ 
englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0026 (Ger.). 
The first sentence of Article 2.2 states: 
“Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity.”282  Plaintiffs 
asserted that the consequentialist decision-making with regard to the use of 
deadly force authorized by the law violated these Basic Law provisions: 
The state may not protect a majority of its citizens by intentionally killing a 
minority – in this case, the crew and the passengers of a plane. A weighing up 
of lives against lives according to the standard of how many people are possi-
bly affected on the one side and how many on the other side is impermissible. 
The state may not kill people because they are fewer in number than the ones 
whom the state hopes to save by their being killed.283 
The Act, they claimed, therefore made them “mere objects of state action.”284 
In defending the law, the government argued that “[a] weighing up of lives 
against lives does not take place in this context.”285  Rather, the state was faced 
with the need to reconcile duties to both innocent persons on the plane and those 
who would be harmed by the crash of the aircraft: 
279. Id. ¶ 14. 
280. Id. 
282. Id. art. 2 § 2. 
283. 1 BVR 357/05, ¶ 38. 
284. Id. ¶ 39. 
285. Id. ¶ 54. 
2019] USE OF FORCE ACROSS THE THREAT CONTINUUM 225 
In this context, the active encroachment upon the fundamental rights of the 
people on board the plane is of extraordinary importance. This, however, can-
not ipso jure enforce non-performance of the duty of protection vis-a`-vis third 
parties where the same legal interest, life, is directly endangered as far as they 
are concerned. The function of averting a danger does not take precedence 
over the function of protection. To perform the latter function, the legislature 
may therefore provide that an imminent attack on human lives may be averted 
even if, in doing so, other people are killed or endangered for instance by fall-
ing plane wreckage.286 
The Court noted that the use of deadly force by the armed forces authorized 
under the Act was to be carried out in support of police operations, not in the con-
text of war. “[M]issions of the armed forces of a non-warlike nature,” the Court 
said, “are incompatible with the right to life and the obligation of the state to 
respect and protect human dignity”287 when they are directed against individuals 
“who are not participants in the crime.”288 The Court declared with respect to 
such individuals: 
By their killing being used as a means to save others, they are treated as objects 
and at the same time deprived of their rights; with their lives being disposed of 
unilaterally by the state, the persons on board the aircraft, who, as victims, are 
themselves in need of protection, are denied the value which is due to a human 
being for his or her own sake.289 
The Court also rejected the argument that innocent persons on the aircraft were 
virtually certain to die in any event when it crashed, which mitigated the infringe-
ment on their rights vis-vis those whom the state was seeking to protect.  “[T]he 
assessment that the persons who are on board a plane that is intended to be used 
against other people’s lives within the meaning of § 14.3 of the Aviation Security 
Act are doomed anyway,” said the Court, does not prevent their intentional kill-
ing from violating their right to life: 
Human life and human dignity enjoy the same constitutional protection regard-
less of the duration of the physical existence of the individual human being . . . . 
Whoever denies this or calls this into question denies those who, such as the 
victims of a hijacking, are in a desperate situation that offers no alternative to 
them, precisely the respect which is due to them for the sake of their human 
dignity . . . .290 
286. Id. 
287. Id. ¶ 130. 
288. Id. 
289. Id. ¶ 124. 
290. Id. ¶ 132. 
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There could not be a clearer articulation of the deontological grounding of 
human rights law and law enforcement standards than the Court’s opinion in this 
case.  The Court reasoned that the state cannot intentionally use lethal force 
against innocent passengers on a hijacked aircraft because those individuals are 
not morally responsible for the threat to others posed by the potential crash of the 
plane. Taking their lives in these circumstances in order to save the lives of 
others, the Court concluded, is to devalue their intrinsic worth by treating them as 
means to an end. 
By contrast, the Court said, shooting down the plane could be permissible if 
officials conclude “that there are only offenders on board the aircraft and . . . that 
the shooting down of the aircraft can avert the danger from the people on the 
ground who are threatened by the plane.”291  In that situation, deadly force would 
be used only against those whose conduct has made them morally liable to it. In 
this respect, it would be consistent with deontological principles.  When the 
state’s goal is to protect individuals from grave harm by others, these are the prin-
ciples that must govern the state’s use of force. 
If, however, an aircraft in these circumstances were commandeered by persons 
who were members of a group with whom the state was engaged in an armed con-
flict, the very same action would be permissible under IHL.  The doctrine of dou-
ble effect would characterize the state’s action not as intentionally killing the 
innocent passengers on board, but as killing them unintentionally in the course of 
killing combatants or civilians directly participating in hostilities, or in the course 
of destroying a military object.292  State use of force would be for the goal of pro-
tecting the state, which means that it would be governed by consequentialist, not 
deontological principles. This is the case even though the actions of state forces 
would be precisely the same in each case. 
The Court adverted to this state self-defense scenario when it observed, “The 
idea that the individual is obliged to sacrifice his or her life in the interest of 
the state as a whole in case of need if this is the only possible way of protecting 
the legally constituted body politic from attacks which are aimed at its breakdown 
and destruction” would not lead to a different result in this case.  This is because 
the purpose of the law was not to “avert[ ] attacks aimed at abolishing the body 
politic and at eliminating the state’s legal and constitutional system.”293  As a 
result, there was no need to decide “whether, and should the occasion arise, under 
which circumstances such a duty of taking responsibility, in solidarity, over and 
above the mechanisms of protection provided in the emergency constitution” 
would be consistent with the Basic Law.294   
291. Id. ¶ 146. 
292. On the doctrine, see Hills, supra note 8. 
293. 1 BVR 357/05, ¶ 135. 
294. Id. 
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The Court’s decision has had a mixed reception,295 
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and some states have taken 
a different approach.  Furthermore, some theorists have suggested that it is possi-
ble to reconcile deontological principles with a balancing of interests.296  
296. See, e.g., Mattias Kumm & Alec D. Walen, Human Dignity and Proportionality: Deontic 
Pluralism in Balancing (N.Y.U. Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series Working Paper No. 
13-03, Feb. 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2195663; David Cummiskey, 
Kantian Consequentialism, 100 ETHICS 586 (1990). 
While 
this may be the case, the decision reflects a straightforward and uncompromising 
application of deontological principles.  Any attempt to uphold the legislation 
within such an analytical framework requires a more complex effort to rebut the 
strong presumption that these principles establish. Thus, the same events can be 
subject to radically different moral assessment depending on whether they fall on 
the human rights or IHL side of the divide.  At least with respect to taking life, 
there is a sharp discontinuity between one body of law and the other.  This is not 
to suggest that human rights principles might not inform even the use of force 
under IHL.  This may be the case, but it will occur in the interstices of a legal re-
gime whose governing moral perspective is consequentialist. 
While one may accept as a descriptive matter that human rights law and IHL 
reflect different approaches to the use of force, it is fair to ask if we should regard 
this as morally acceptable.  Given widespread acceptance of deontological princi-
ples with regard to taking life, perhaps we should strive to regulate armed conflict 
according to those principles.  One response to this position is that, as Janina Dill 
has explained, there are fundamental epistemic obstacles to obtaining the infor-
mation that would be necessary to do this.297  On this view, the ostensible conse-
quentialism of IHL is an unfortunate but unavoidable departure from basic moral 
principles rooted in deontology. 
A second response is that IHL is consistent with deontological principles in 
that it is grounded in a lesser evil justification.  This asserts that “the infringement 
of individual rights can be justified as the lesser evil if the greater evil would con-
sist of more violations of individual rights.”298  This “utilitarianism of rights,” as 
Robert Nozick critically termed it,299 maintains that minimizing the level of rights 
violations is a way of respecting rights under challenging conditions.  David 
Luban, for instance, acknowledges criticism that aggregating rights in this way is 
inconsistent with a commitment to individual human dignity.  He suggests, how-
ever, that “[i]t is still human rights thinking because the weighing and trade-offs 
297. Moral Acceptability of War, supra note 276. 
298. Moral Acceptability of War, supra note 276, at 260. 
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take place between rights and rights; basic rights cannot be traded off for interests 
less significant than basic rights.”300  Ultimately, he says, “when entitlements 
conflict with each other, something has to give, and human rights thinking cannot 
ignore conflicts among rights or argue them away.”301  This approach is conse-
quentialist in that it focuses on outcomes or states of the world, but purports to 
respect intrinsic individual worth in a way that conventional consequentialism 
does not. 
Finally, of course, one may argue that conventional consequentialism is a mo-
rality that is appropriate for the realm of public affairs and collective concerns in 
a way that deontological theory is not.  As Terry Nardin has noted, “applied ethics 
assumes that public policy should be guided and judged by the same principles 
that govern individual conduct.  Many philosophers of the past would have found 
this an odd view of the matter.”302 Similarly, Thomas Nagel, while not a conse-
quentialist, suggests that “[w]ithin the appropriate limits, public decisions will be 
justifiably more consequentialist than private ones. They will also have larger 
consequences to take into account.”303 On this view, IHL is grounded in a moral 
theory that is justified for the arena of human affairs in which it operates. 
I do not have the space in this article to assess the persuasiveness of claims 
regarding the moral defensibility of consequentialism.  I will simply say that at a 
minimum the conduct of armed conflict seems unavoidably to involve the conse-
quentialist approach that is embodied in IHL. 
E. Crossing the Moral Rubicon 
What is the implication of recognizing the fundamentally different governing 
moral principles of human rights law and IHL for proposals such as those by 
Hakimi and Brooks?  It suggests that the domain method serves an important pur-
pose of demarcating a radical shift in perspectives, even if operational reality of-
ten presents scenarios that blur the distinction between law enforcement and 
armed conflict.  Each domain reflects a strikingly different presumption with 
respect to taking human life.  A state should not be able gradually to expand the 
force that it uses, and the terms on which it uses it, without eventually declaring 
that it is engaged in an armed conflict in defense of the state.  It should not be able 
to avoid this requirement on the ground that such expansion of force simply rep-
resents a series of adjustments on a common continuum.   At some point, incre-
mental quantitative changes become qualitative, and deontological concerns give 
way to consequentialist ones. 
At that point, a state should be required to inform the world that it intends to 
cross the Rubicon – that it plans to enter a moral universe that is different in pro-
found ways from the one governed by human rights law.  This should be a 
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momentous public step, not a simple adjustment of rules of engagement to take 
account of exigencies that make adherence to deontological principles progres-
sively more difficult.  Even if hostilities may be arrayed on a continuum – even if 
“peace” is never free of some violence and conflict – it is important to distinguish 
peace from war because of the expansive presumptions for the use of force that 
the latter involves. 
At the same time, Hakimi’s important insight is that there is more flexibility 
within each domain than people commonly believe, especially in human rights 
law.  For a variety of reasons, states are reluctant to declare themselves as 
involved in an armed conflict when engaged in hostilities with non-state groups, 
especially within their own territories.  This means that many if not most counter-
terrorism campaigns will fall into the category of law enforcement operations 
governed by human rights law.  As we have seen, that body of law has the flexi-
bility to accommodate a wide range of circumstances in which the state uses force 
against various types of threats. 
This underscores the importance of not assuming that human rights law reflects 
absolute principles that impose strict uniform limits on the use of force in all sit-
uations outside of armed conflict.  That assumption reflects the notion of rights as 
trumps that never can be balanced against other interests.  Yet even the most fun-
damental human right, the right to life, is protected against “arbitrary depriva-
tion” in the ICCPR, and against the use of force that is more than “absolutely 
necessary” in the ECHR.  This reflects the fact that what it means to respect even 
the most important human right will depend on deliberations about the weight of 
various interests in particular circumstances. This suggests that it may be more 
useful to think of rights as presumptions rather than trumps.  Presumptions 
require rigorous demonstration in each case that they need to give way to some 
extent for the sake of other interests – and only to the extent that is necessary to 
further those interests.  The standard for rebutting this presumption with respect 
to the right to life is the most demanding of all. 
In the spirit of a friendly amendment, a useful way to utilize Hakimi’s 
approach, as well as to implement Brooks’s suggestion, might be to use human 
rights law as the default category, and to draw on Hakimi’s principles to guide 
analysis of the extent to which the strict deontological presumptions of human 
rights law should be relaxed in particular circumstances up to the point at which 
such presumptions are no longer reasonable.  Sensitivity to these principles can 
enable sophisticated assessments of the nature and level of force that is permissi-
ble in various situations, with the presumption against taking life constraining 
flexibility as much as possible.  These assessments would not rely on an idealized 
conception of “peacetime,” but would acknowledge that threats may take various 
forms that require differentiated permissions to use force in response.  States 
would navigate the moral Rubicon in the sense that they would be a fair distance 
from the paradigmatic law enforcement scenario, and might even be able to 
glimpse the armed conflict side of the river.  At the same time, they ideally would 
be able to avoid taking the fateful step of stepping on to it as long as possible. 
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At some point, this moment may come.  The need to depart from deontological 
presumptions will become so extensive that there will be a need to acknowledge 
a discontinuity: the existence of “a specific and unique set of conditions, the exis-
tence of which suffices to justify first-resort killing that is otherwise unjustifi-
able.”304  This should be regarded as an unavoidable and regrettable shift to a 
predominantly consequentialist framework, rather than an incremental adjust-
ment along a continuum defined by common overarching principles.  This would 
accept Hakimi’s implicit assumption that human rights law should provide the 
background framework for analysis, but would recognize that it cannot do so for 
all situations along the entire continuum. 
Some might object that this posits a flexibility for human rights law so capacious 
that it threatens to undermine the integrity of this body of law as a distinct regime of 
governance.  This concern about the dilution of human rights law has been explored 
in a thoughtful article by Naz Modirzadeh.305  The article explores whether certain 
obligations under IHL should be characterized as human rights obligations, but her 
points are relevant as well to the extent to which human rights law should maintain a 
sharp distinction between itself and IHL.  Modirzadeh focuses mainly, although not 
exclusively, on the implications of framing the obligations of an armed force exercis-
ing control over foreign territory as assuming extraterritorial human rights obliga-
tions.  Her insights are relevant as well, however, to regulation of the use of force. 
Modirzadeh notes the repudiation in most quarters of the notion that IHL com-
pletely displaces human rights law in times of armed conflict.  As she observes, 
while it is now generally accepted that human rights law continues to apply in 
armed conflicts alongside IHL, “the question of how these bodies of law should 
apply in tandem, what provisions of human rights law continue to apply to the 
State and what additional obligations are created by the operation of human rights 
law are hotly contested.”306  In particular, what if any human rights obligations 
does a state continue to have when engaged in extraterritorial military operations? 
Modirzadeh notes that a common assumption is that progress in protecting 
individuals will involve greater convergence between human rights law and IHL, 
so that the former body of law expands its influence over the latter.  From this per-
spective, she says: 
[I]t seems natural that those in favor of human rights, humane treatment of 
individuals in detention and increased regulation of warfare would be on the 
side of more convergence, while those on the side of powerful States, limita-
tion of individual rights in favor of national security and protection of the enti-
tlements of the military against the involvement of the international 
community are on the side of discrete application and strong use of the lex spe-
cialis principle to privilege IHL over IHRL during armed conflict.307 
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A problem with the assumption of the desirability of convergence, Modirzadeh 
argues, is that for the most part it is simply an article of faith. As she puts it, “the 
field has not been subject to critical thinking on the possible costs of bringing 
human rights discourse and human rights frameworks into the realm of war.”308 
Modirzadeh observes, for instance, that a commonly accepted criterion for 
when a state military force begins to have extraterritorial human rights obliga-
tions toward a foreign population is when it exercises effective control over the 
territory where that population is located, or  over an individual.  Indeed, this is 
the point at which Watkin argues that state forces should be held to at least some 
human rights obligations.  Such a test defines a situation that also resembles, 
although it may not formally constitute, an occupation, which is regulated under 
IHL by the Fourth Geneva Convention.  Support for the increasing application of 
human rights law in armed conflict would suggest that its requirements should be 
used to elaborate on and supplement the rights that are set forth in Geneva IV. 
Modirzadeh maintains, however, that this approach rests on a fundamental 
misconception of the relationship of a foreign population to a military force that 
controls the territory where that population resides.  As she suggests, “life under 
occupation was never meant to be like life in one’s country governed by one’s 
own leader(s),” which is the fundamental concern of human rights law.309 
Rather, “occupation law secures the minimum protections of the occupied, but it 
also acts to prevent the occupying power from slipping into the position of the 
legitimate (read national, territorial) government.”310  Thus: 
[w]hatever the specific function of these restraints in a given occupation situa-
tion, the normative spirit of the law, the message that it communicates to the 
occupied population, is clear: the international community does not believe 
that the occupier is in your country for your good or benefit, and its stay is tem-
porary, potentially difficult, violent and limited.311 
The advantage of occupation law, Modirzadeh says, “is that it does not allow 
us to forget that we are in armed conflict. It does not allow us to pretend that we 
are in peace, or that the population has consented to its situation.”312 
For this reason, relying on effective control of an area as the basis for triggering 
extraterritorial human rights obligations during armed conflict “seems to threaten 
the very core of human rights principles: that they are intimately tied to the way 
in which a State governs, the ways in which it communicates its system of gover-
nance to its people, and the means by which it demonstrates its accountability to 
their rights claims and rights enjoyment over time. How can enemy soldiers step 
into this governance function?”313  Their interaction with residents will be far 
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more circumscribed, and the rights that they are able to honor will be far more 
limited than those contained in human rights instruments. 
What will this mean for our understanding of human rights?  “If the Iraqi can-
not have the same rights during conflict or occupation as I do during peacetime in 
my home State, but human rights lawyers want to argue that he ‘has human 
rights’ what rights should he have? What does human rights mean if we strip it 
down this way, if we pick at which rights can be enforced in which circumstances 
by particular armies at particular times?”314  Modirzadeh argues that if the greater 
influence of human rights law in these types of situations “fails to deliver in any 
meaningful way in terms of material changes to the experience of civilians in 
armed conflict . . . will human rights law and rights discourse suffer lasting dam-
age?”315  Furthermore, to what extent might extending the discourse of human 
rights to this setting “threaten the indivisibility principle of human rights law? Do 
we open the door for States to argue that other situations would justify applying 
rights obligations on a sliding scale?”316 
Applying this perspective to the use of force, one might fear that as the level of 
violence that human rights law must assess intensifies, at some point this body of 
law will simply mirror the consequentialist presumptions of IHL in all but name 
only.  As Modirzadeh puts it: 
To the extent that human rights lawyers and advocates come to speak in the 
language of IHL, with its acceptance of civilian deaths that are not excessive 
in relation to the military advantage anticipated, its recognition of the massive 
destruction to military objects waged in war, its constant balancing of human-
ity against the powerful argument of military necessity, and its faith in the de-
cision making of the reasonable commander, will something be lost in the 
advocacy for the rights of individuals?317 
I have focused on one aspect of a complex argument that Modirzadeh presents, 
and there are potential responses to some of her concerns.  Nonetheless, her argu-
ment illuminates the risk that applying human rights law in situations that may 
require significant concessions to practical exigencies could subtly reshape our 
understanding of that body of law.  It is not the case, for instance, that human 
rights law could not conceivably take into account the demands of using force 
even in hostilities that effectively are armed conflict, as we have seen with the 
European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence on the hostilities between Russia 
and Chechen rebels.  The concern rather is, as its influence expands, at what point 
does the conception of human rights that it reflects become unrecognizable in 
terms of the basic commitments of that body of law? 
314. Modirzadeh, supra note 228, at 373. 
315. Modirzadeh, supra note 228, at 374. 
316. Modirzadeh, supra note 228, at 378. 
317. Modirzadeh, supra note 228, at 381. 
2019] USE OF FORCE ACROSS THE THREAT CONTINUUM 233 
This risk must be taken seriously. The question is whether it is worth accepting 
it for the sake of requiring that the use of force be justified within a framework 
that adopts deontological presumptions.  These presumptions can do important 
work, even if human rights law may permit levels of military violence that are 
quite different from what is used by the police officer on the beat.  The crucial dif-
ference between human rights law and IHL in cases involving escalation of force 
is that human rights law adopts the presumption that force should be used only to 
protect innocent lives from violent threats – not to protect the state by defeating 
an enemy.  To reiterate, the human rights principle of necessity requires that force 
be used only when “strictly unavoidable,”318 and “absolutely necessary,”319 not 
simply when it achieves a military advantage. When the use of force is unavoid-
able, the principle of proportionality requires that force be used “in proportion to 
the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved.”320 
This is quite different from assessing whether civilian casualties are excessive 
compared to the military advantage that has been achieved. 
Human rights principles of necessity and proportionality thus aim to minimize 
loss of human life, rather than to do so within the demands of military necessity. 
A state may be able to use a significant amount of military force in a given 
instance, but it must justify this in terms that are more protective of life than IHL 
requires. As I have described above, for instance, the European Court of Human 
Rights evaluated Russia’s aerial assault on the town of Katyr-Yurt in Isayeva II 
as an operation to protect civilians within the town who were threatened by 
Chechen rebels, not to protect the state by defeating those rebels. Furthermore, 
the state’s responsibility to respect human life requires that it plan its operations 
in order to avoid the use of deadly force in general and civilian casualties in par-
ticular.321 
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It therefore makes a difference if the use of force is subject to assess-
ment under the presumptions of human rights law rather than IHL, even if a state 
may be able to depart from those presumptions to some extent in particular cases. 
Watkin’s preference for a totality of the circumstances test is more sensitive to 
the discontinuity between human rights law and IHL than is the purely contextual 
approach that Hakimi proposes.  As he puts it, “[i]t is . . . unlikely that the target-
ing provisions of international customary and treaty law could be readily changed 
to adopt a more homogeneous framework.”322  At some point, circumstances may 
be such that the only way to respond effectively to a threat is to use force in a way 
that cannot conform to the deontological demands of human rights law.  When 
this moment arrives, it reflects a change in perspective that is qualitative, not sim-
ply incrementally quantitative. 
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CONCLUSION 
For better or worse, we seem to live in a period in which there is some skepti-
cism about the integrity of legal categories relating to the use of force.  This has 
led to the claim in some quarters that the boundary between these categories has 
been irrevocably eroded, and that we need new conceptual resources to navigate 
a novel terrain. The greater prominence of human rights law in recent decades 
also has led some to question whether that body of law and IHL reflect distinctive 
domains ordered by distinctive principles.  On one view, human rights law is 
gradually colonizing IHL and remaking it in its own image. As I have argued, 
this claim elides the fact that IHL reflects the unavoidable necessity of relying on 
consequentialist reasoning in attempting to protect collective interests. 
At the same time, the emergence of decentralized networks of non-state armed 
groups calls into question whether the existence of an armed conflict remains a re-
alistic test for the use of force under a military rather than police model.  This sug-
gests that principles drawn from wartime may begin to penetrate what we 
traditionally have regarded as the domain of peace, as we evaluate uses of force 
along a continuum that reflects ostensibly common overarching principles. As I 
have argued, this claim also elides the significant discontinuity between the moral 
visions of human rights law and IHL. 
Kenneth Watkin has lived in this dynamic world for some time, and appreci-
ates the need to rethink many of our traditional assumptions in light of the com-
plex nature of modern security threats and operations responding to them.  He 
resists, however, the claim that it is necessary to abandon our traditional analyti-
cal categories in order to deal effectively with this messy reality.  His police pri-
macy principle assumes that human rights law can guide the use of force in many 
contexts in which it is necessary to use violence, including even some situations 
within armed conflict. His reliance on this category reflects the view that “the law 
enforcement paradigm has overall helped ensure life within States is more secure 
and less violent . . . . Too early a recognition of the existence of an armed conflict 
can result in greater potential for the use of violence.”323 
Watkin thus regards distinguishing between law enforcement and armed con-
flict as both feasible and desirable.  “[W]hile there can be controversy and dis-
agreement as to when an armed conflict is in existence,” he says, “there is value 
in the debate in terms of defining and ultimately limiting the scope of that con-
flict.”324  While operating within the flexible human rights framework can accom-
modate the need to use force to respond to a range of threats, at some point it will 
be necessary to consider whether the more expansive permissions of IHL are nec-
essary for an effective response.  This suggestion by someone who has worked 
directly with the challenges facing military forces in war time reflects awareness 
of the need to demarcate entry into that grim moral universe. 
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Life inevitably outruns our conceptual categories; the challenge is to determine 
when we can adapt them and when we must abandon them in our quest for experi-
ential coherence.  The world has always been a dangerous place, and violence has 
always been with us, but the concepts of war and peace have provided ways of 
making sense of the world and our aspirations for it for quite some time.  We 
should think hard about whether the world we now live in is so radically different 
from the past that these categories are no longer useful.  We may never live in a 
world in which there is a clear boundary between war and peace.  We may be bet-
ter off, however, if – without illusions – we act as if we do.  
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